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Abstract  
 
The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO, constitutes the 
largest and longest lasting manifestation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in EU 
history.  Deployed in 2008 following Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia after 
nine years of administration by the UN, EULEX is tasked with monitoring, mentoring, and 
advising relevant local authorities in the reconstitution of a justice system conforming to 
European standards.  EULEX personnel are deployed in capacities of policing, forensics, 
customs, prosecution, and judiciary.  Despite 15 years of international assistance in this field, 
Kosovo remains a place plagued by inter-ethnic tensions, organized crime, and corruption.  
Following a brief, but costly ethnic war in 1998-99, and ensuing inter-ethnic violence, the Serb 
minority of Kosovo separated into defensible enclaves spread around the territory, the largest 
being north of the Ibar River, contiguous with Serbia.  Since 1999, these enclaves have grown 
divergent from the central authorities in Prishtina and heavily reliant on Serbian-backed parallel 
structures of administration and security.  Consequently in reforming a uniform rule of law 
system in Kosovo, EULEX faces the challenge of bridging an ethno-territorial cleavage, 
characterized by stark nationalism and embedded resistance to the other.   
In this paper, I examine EULEX’s ability to act as a liberal peace actor in instituting a 
uniform rule of law system in post-war Kosovo.  Although it portrays itself as a highly technical 
actor to appease all sides, EULEX’s ability to function is politically dependent.  As a result, rule 
of law has a become an overtly political process dependent on dialogue and compromise.  This 
greatly empowers local illiberal elites, while largely failing to engage with Kosovo’s societal 
space and thus failing to engender local ownership of rule of law.  The case of EULEX 
KOSOVO is important and can serve as an example for future Western civilian crisis 
management operations in post-conflict settings such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Georgia, and Ukraine.   
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Section I – Introduction 
 
How effective are international institutions in establishing rule of law following 
inter-ethnic conflict?  In this study I will address this question through a case study of the 
European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX).  The European Union took 
over the responsibility for reforming for the rule of law (RoL) in Kosovo after it declared 
its independence from Serbia in February 2008.  This followed nine years as an 
internationally governed territory under the United Nations Interim Administration in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) from 1999.  During 1998-99, Kosovo was the site of an armed conflict 
between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Kosovar1 insurgency, the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA; UÇK), but this was preceded by a decade of institutional 
oppression of Kosovars by the FRY under the leadership of Slobodan Milošević.  
Consequently in 1999 Kosovo was an entity lacking both centralized RoL institutions and 
a population that culturally accepted central authority as legitimate.  After fifteen years of 
international RoL programming, however, Kosovo remains plagued by the effects of an 
inadequate justice system with a limited scope.  Sometimes compared to Croatia, which 
achieved EU accession just 18 years after the end of its war for independence, Kosovo 
has failed to exhibit noticeable progress towards EU standards in the rule of law fields, 
despite consistently high investment on the EU’s behalf.2   
In this paper I will present EULEX within a framework of a RoL-based liberal 
peace actor (relevant theory to be presented in Section II).  Once establishing a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In this paper I apply the nomenclature Kosovar to the ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo as to 
distinguish it from both the Serb population of Kosovo and the Albanians of neighboring Albania, who 
experienced a drastically different history in the second half of the 20th Century.   
2 By the 2012 European Court of Auditors’ report on rule of law progress in Kosovo, the EU had invested 
€116 per capita in assistance to Kosovo, more than double the next assistance recipient in the Western 
Balkans (Montenegro: €55).  See, European Union Assistance to Kosovo as Related to the Rule of Law. 
European Court of Auditors Special Report No. 18//2012 (2012).   
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theoretical framework of liberal peace building, I present information collected in 
interviews carried out in Prishtina, Kosovo and surrounding municipalities in 2014 (more 
details on interview process in Section III).  The analytical narrative in which this 
information is presented, begins by identifying the central themes of EULEX 
programming as being inherently politicized (Section V).  The analytical narrative 
proceeds to examine those societal factors constraining an imported model of RoL 
development (Section VI).  And the analytical narrative finishes by presenting EULEX as 
a model for RoL-based civilian crisis management operations (Section VII), including 
public opinion of it and ethno-territorially disparate practices.  The conclusion (Section 
VIII) ultimately presents EULEX’s model of RoL building in an ethnically divided 
setting as a political practice, a process itself in conflict with RoL principles.  It can 
further be concluded that through its failure to address societal obstacles to RoL and 
generate support through positive and successful practices, that EULEX is an indication 
of a flawed model of RoL-based civilian crisis management.   
 
EULEX KOSOVO 
The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (hereafter EULEX) 
constitutes the largest and longest lasting manifestation of EU foreign and security policy 
(in its current form the Common Foreign and Security Policy: CFSP).  EU foreign and 
security policy began a rapid evolution following the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s, when 
it became clear that the normative transformation that had been successful in the 
Visegrad and Baltic states was not sufficient in the setting of former Yugoslavia.3  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In first the Visegrad (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) and then the Baltic (Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania) states, the EU (then ECC) concluded Europe Agreements, which made official those states’ 
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Beginning at the Cologne Summit in 1999 and continuing through 2003, the EU devoted 
considerable attention to the reform of its foreign and security policy, previously 
contained in Pillar II of the Maastricht Treaty, and produced both the European Security 
and Defense Policy (ESDP) and European Security Strategy (ESS).  Both of these, and 
additional documents, made clear the EU’s preferred focus on civilian crisis management 
options, which privileged development and human rights.  EU commitment to RoL-
specific operations was manifested during this process, which included the 
acknowledgment of a need for judicial and prosecutorial advisors to be deployed in 
concert with any police mission.  Provisions for financial assistance to the rebuilding of 
justice infrastructure were also included as was the explicit pledging of direct support in 
the RoL field to the ongoing UN administrations in Kosovo (UNMIK) and East Timor 
(UNTAET) (Santa Maria de Feira European Council, 2000).4 
UN Special Envoy to Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive Proposal for the 
Kosovo Status Settlement (hereafter Ahtisaari Plan) called for an ESDP-led RoL 
operation in Kosovo following independence.  However it was vetoed in the UN Security 
Council by Russia in July 2007.  The following February (2008), just days prior to the 
unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo’s provisional institutions, the Council 
of the EU voted EULEX into existence as a strictly civilian crisis management operation 
and its deployment commenced in December 2008.  EULEX’s professed mission was to 
assist the relevant Kosovo institutions in developing and strengthening a multi-ethnic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
aspirations for integration with attached democratic conditionality.  See: David R. Cameron. "Post-
communist democracy: The impact of the European Union." Post-Soviet Affairs 23.3 (2007): 185-217. 
4 See: “European Security and Defense Policy: The Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management.” The European 
Union: European Security and Defense Policy (2009); See: “Presidency Conclusions: Santa Maria de Feira 
European Council, 19 and 20 June 2000”; “Concept of EU Monitoring Missions” Council of the European 
Union (2003). 
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justice system, police and customs service, and ensuring that they are free from political 
interference and adhere to best European practices (Council Joint Action 
2008/124/CFSP).  Without universal recognition of Kosovo’s independence, including by 
Russia and thus the Security Council, and five EU member states, EULEX was unable to 
deploy in the capacity it had planned for within the framework of the Ahtisaari Plan.5 
In order to legally deploy in the contested territory of Kosovo, EULEX was 
forced to reject the Ahtisaari Plan and work within the ‘status-neutral’ framework of 
UNSCR 1244, which had created UNMIK in 1999 and guaranteed the territorial integrity 
of Serbia, thus not recognizing Kosovo’s sovereignty.  This was formalized in “The Six-
Point Plan”, an agreement between the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon and the 
Serbian government, but rejected by the Government of Kosovo (GoK). Contained within 
the “Six-Point Plan” were provisions for extensive autonomy of the majority Serb 
populated areas of Kosovo.  This included separate chains of command for Serb police, a 
justice system autonomous from the centralized Kosovar one, and responsibility for the 
protection of Serbian Orthodox sites being handed to the Serbian government (Džihić and 
Kramer, 2009; and, GLPS, 2012).   
As a consequence of the “Six-Point Plan” confusion quickly arose around 
EULEX’s deployment.  While the agreement between the UN and the Serbian 
government ‘legalized’ EULEX from the perspective of international law, it 
delegitimized the mission domestically.  The Ahtisaari Plan, contained within the  
Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo is where the invitation for EULEX is explicitly 
stated.  Furthermore the legal basis for EULEX’s operation, including all legal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 EU Member States Spain, Slovakia, Romania, and Cyprus all reject Kosovo’s independence, citing 
secessionist movements inside their own countries as reason.  Greece also does not recognize Kosovo’s 
independence.  Initially undecided, Greece eventually sided with its traditional orthodox ally Serbia.   
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conclusions reached, is the legislation of the Republic of Kosovo.  However in the 
acceptance of status neutrality provided for in the “Six-Point Plan”, EULEX explicitly 
renounces both the Ahtisaari Plan and all legislation for Government of Kosovo.  Thus by 
the letter of the agreement legalizing its deployment, EULEX must reject its own stated 
legal basis (Muharremi, 2010; KIPRED 1/13, 2013; KCSS, 2011).   
Image 1: Political graffiti 
in Prishtina depicting 
UNMIK and EULEX as 
one and the same.  
Credit: Author’s 
photograph 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Due to this confusion, EULEX has endeavored in its discourse to remove all 
political alignment and portray itself as a strictly technical and apolitical mission (KCSS, 
2012).  Despite this, however, it has continued to embed personnel within the central 
Kosovar RoL institutions and apply the laws of Republic of Kosovo, while striving to 
maintain its ‘status-neutral’ designation in the eyes of the Serb population and Serbian 
government – adopting what one think-tank labeled ‘chameleonic pragmatism’ (KIPRED 
1/13, 2013).  Such behavior, though, affected acceptance of EULEX by the local 
population.  To Kosovars, it was seen as a product of compromise, and its warm welcome 
and hope surrounding its mission quickly dissipated (GLPS 05/2014, 2014; and interview 
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with Armend Muja, Prishtina 2014).6  Serbs never accepted the status-neutral guise, and 
instead viewed EULEX as a state-building operation (interview with Valdete Idrizi, 
Prishtina 20147; and, interview with Ilir Deda, Prishtina 2014).8 
Once deployed in Kosovo, a process that lasted from December 2008 to April 
2009, EULEX has executed both strengthening and executive operations in concert with 
the relevant local authorities, with the ultimate goal of implementing the same RoL 
standards across the whole of Kosovo (interview with EU official, Prishtina 2014).9  
EULEX was officially divided into strengthening and executive divisions in 2012, with 
the strengthening division devoted to monitoring, mentoring, and advising (MMA) local 
authorities; and the executive division carrying out police or judicial operations, where 
the local authorities are deemed unable.  In much of Kosovo EULEX performs primarily 
strengthening operations, but retains executive jurisdiction in cases of war crimes and 
organized crimes.   
Working as a model for local authorities, EULEX prosecutors serve alongside 
Kosovars in the Special Prosecution for the Republic of Kosovo (SPRK) and judges sit 
on the Constitution Court, and the Kosovo Judicial Council (KCSS, 2011).  However, 
despite the clear acknowledgement of the need for prosecutorial and judicial staff as early 
as 2000, these fields of the mission have been largely overshadowed by the police and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Armend Muja is currently a PhD candidate and lecturer on political economy.  In 2007 he served as a EU 
integration consultant and has also worked as a communication specialist for UNDP.  He holds an MA in 
economics from the London School of Economics. 
7 Valdete Idrizi is director of CiviKos, a civil society platform in Prishtina, coordinating 140 civil society 
organizations.  She has managed CiviKos for three years.  Originally from Mitrovica, prior to CiviKos, she 
founded and managed Community Building Mitrovica. 
8 Ilir Deda recently stepped down as managing director of the Kosovo Institute for Policy Research and 
Development (KIPRED) after being elected as a member of the assembly for the Lëvizja Vëtevendosje! 
party.  Prior to KIPRED he worked at the Geneva Center for Security Policy and during the last presidential 
administration he served as the Chief of Staff for the President.  Mr. Deda holds a BA in political science 
and an MA in international affairs.   
9 This participant chose to remain confidential. 
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customs components.  Only 13% of deployed EULEX personnel constitute these two 
fields, referred to as the ‘Justice Component’ (KIPRED 1/13, 2013).  This small 
allotment has proved largely incapable of handling both the backlog of 1,187 cases 
inherited from the UNMIK justice system, and those new cases brought by EULEX 
(GLPS 05/2014, 2014).  The fight against corruption has produced largely unsatisfactory 
results, including only a single prosecution of a high-level public official, despite 
overwhelming data suggesting systematic corruption in all sectors of public 
administration from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (KIPRED 1/14, 2014).10 
In Northern Kosovo (defined as that territory north of the Ibar River, which runs 
through Mitrovica/Kosovska Mitrovica) EULEX has traditionally discharged an 
exclusively executive mandate in the absence of local authorities. Here, both the GoK 
and EULEX have failed to establish authority since independence, as did UNMIK during 
its tenure (GLPS, 2013).  Operations in the North [of Kosovo] include the maintenance of 
two formed police units, a response unit for riot control and breaching unit.11  In North 
Mitrovica EULEX is fully responsible for the operation of the court, even after its new 
mandate in 2014, aimed at decreasing executive operations in the rest of Kosovo 
(Interview with EULEX Executive Official, Prishtina 2014).  The reasoning behind a 
different approach to RoL programming in the North is complex and rooted in historical, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) findings indicate that on average 11% of Kosovo’s population 
experiences having to bribe a public official yearly.  See, “Corruption in Kosovo: Bribery as Experienced 
by the Population.” UNODC (2011); and, “Business, Corruption, and Crime in Kosovo: The Impact of 
Bribery and Other Crime on Private Enterprise.” UNODC (2013). 
11 “Breaching Unit”, the official terminology used by an interview participant from the EULEX 
Strengthening Division, refers to a unit specially trained in and armed for high-risk arrests, similar to an 
American SWAT team.  Both formed units are composed entirely of members of the same nationality for 
operational straightforwardness.  Currently the response unit is entirely Polish and the breaching unit is 
entirely French (interview with EULEX Strengthening official, Prishtina 2014).    
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political, and public opinion factors to be presented in the proceeding context and 
analysis sections.   
Since its deployment began in 2008, EULEX has been largely unpopular with the 
local population and the object of extensive criticism.  Some, which has already been 
presented, is aimed at EULEX’s “chameleonic pragmatism” of status-neutrality, rightly 
seen as compromise with Serbia, and often further attributed to division over Kosovo’s 
status within the EU membership.  Further condemnation is leveled at the discourse of 
EULEX, including its mandate, mission statement, and those public statements made by 
its various heads of mission (HoM) throughout the course of its deployment.  This 
discourse includes an abundance of ambitious, yet ambiguous objectives leaving the local 
population and local RoL counterparts unsure of what EULEX actually does or is 
charged with doing while in Kosovo, often including “helping”, “assisting”, “ensuring”, 
“contributing to”, “whenever needed”, and the common “best European practices”, which 
includes no elaboration (Forum for Security, 2011; KCSS, 2012; KIPRED 1/13, 2013).  
Criticism of excessive executive operations will be presented subsequently in the review 
of relevant literature and analysis sections, while further analysis of the public opinion 
surrounding EULEX will be presented in the “EULEX as a Model” analysis section.   	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Section	  II	  –	  Literature	  Review	  	  
	  
Liberal	  and	  Post-­‐Liberal	  Peace	  Theories	  It	  is	  widely	  accepted	  that	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  the	  prevailing	  mode	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  management	  by	  the	  international	  community	  has	  been	  liberal	  peace	  building.	  	  The	  Liberal	  Peace	  Thesis	  is	  founded	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  democracies,	  with	  a	  couple	  of	  exceptions,	  don’t	  go	  to	  war	  with	  each	  other	  (Paris,	  2006;	  and,	  Muravchik,	  1996).12	  	  Joshua	  Muravchik	  (1996)	  argues	  in	  favor	  of	  democracy	  as	  something	  of	  a	  political	  cure-­‐all,	  including	  for	  intra-­‐state	  conflicts,	  which	  provides	  the	  means	  of	  civil	  dispute	  resolution	  “without	  recourse	  to	  violence”	  (Muravchik,	  1996:	  576).	  	  In	  doing	  so	  he	  rejects	  the	  argument	  that	  ‘hybrid	  polities’,	  characterized	  by	  David	  Roberts	  (2008)	  as	  displaying	  some	  aspects	  of	  democracy	  but	  not	  all,	  are	  at	  an	  increased	  risk	  of	  conflict.	  This	  claim	  by	  Muravchik	  is	  refuted	  in	  a	  broad	  sample	  of	  conflict	  literature.	  	  Most	  notably	  Jack	  Snyder	  (2000)	  finds	  that	  intra-­‐state	  conflict	  is	  most	  likely	  to	  occur	  in	  these	  hybrid	  polities,	  which	  can	  be	  transitional	  or	  weak	  democracies.	  	  While	  in	  fully	  functional	  democracies,	  the	  population	  has	  civic	  means	  of	  dispute	  resolution	  other	  than	  violence,	  as	  noted	  by	  Muravchik.	  	  Authoritarian	  regimes	  tend	  to	  be	  characterized	  by	  repressive	  security	  institutions	  and	  media	  controls	  that	  prevent	  dissent	  or	  insurgency	  from	  being	  fostered	  (Snyder,	  2000;	  Fearon	  and	  Laiton,	  2003).	  	  Roberts	  further	  argues	  that	  one	  “cannot	  safely	  anticipate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Muravchick	  identifies	  the	  notable	  exceptions	  of	  the	  UK	  declaring	  war	  on	  Finland	  during	  World	  War	  II	  and	  Lebanon	  going	  to	  war	  with	  Israel,	  however	  argues	  that	  these	  are	  ‘exceptions	  that	  prove	  the	  rule’	  as	  the	  British	  and	  Finnish	  militaries	  never	  engaged	  each	  other	  and	  Lebanon	  served	  as	  a	  peace	  broker	  between	  the	  other	  Arab	  states	  and	  Israel.	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that	  holding	  elections	  will	  result	  in	  durable	  democracy	  of	  any	  gravitas”	  (Roberts,	  2008:	  541).	  	  	  One	  of	  those	  factors,	  which	  contributes	  to	  potential	  internal	  conflict	  in	  transitional	  democracy	  is	  prematurely	  hosted	  elections	  (Snyder,	  2000;	  and,	  Roeder	  and	  Rothchild,	  2005).	  	  Philip	  Roeder	  and	  Donald	  Rothchild	  (2005)	  argue	  the	  process	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  democratization	  is	  best	  prescribed	  as	  a	  longer	  process	  of	  ‘nation-­‐state	  stewardship’	  by	  international	  actors.	  	  According	  to	  their	  argument,	  the	  focus	  in	  societally	  divided	  settings	  should	  be	  on	  the	  building	  of	  democratic	  institutions,	  starting	  at	  the	  lowest	  levels	  and	  delaying	  the	  building	  of	  institutions	  that	  govern	  from	  the	  center	  (Roeder	  and	  Rothchild,	  2005).	  	  This	  emphasis	  on	  the	  building	  of	  institutions	  is	  a	  common	  tenet,	  omnipresent	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  liberal	  peace-­‐building.	  	  In	  An	  Agenda	  for	  Peace	  (1992),	  UN	  Secretary	  General	  Boutros	  Boutros-­‐Ghali	  writes	  that	  the	  most	  successful	  means	  of	  peace	  building	  is	  strengthening	  institutions	  that	  promote	  confidence	  and	  well-­‐being	  between	  peoples,	  to	  be	  achieved	  through	  democracy	  and	  development	  (Boutros-­‐Ghali,	  1993).	  	  Roland	  Paris	  (2006)	  argues	  that	  in	  a	  post-­‐war	  setting,	  ‘a	  robust	  framework	  of	  institutions’	  is	  required	  to	  prevent	  local	  actors	  and	  elites	  from	  undermining	  the	  principles	  of	  democratic	  development.	  	  Paris	  further	  notes	  the	  importance	  of	  institutions	  to	  the	  (re)development	  of	  the	  market	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  settings	  (Paris,	  2006).	  	  	  While	  the	  building	  of	  local	  institutions	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  settings	  by	  international	  ‘stewards’	  may	  seem	  relatively	  straight	  forward,	  as	  Boutros-­‐Ghali	  (1993)	  suggests,	  especially	  in	  the	  security	  sector,	  institutional	  creation	  does	  not	  suffice	  for	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  liberal	  peace.	  	  Liberal	  peace	  building	  literature	  devotes	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considerable	  attention	  to	  the	  conundrum	  that	  arises	  from	  bestowing	  legitimacy	  upon	  domestic	  institutions	  that	  are	  built	  and	  fostered	  by	  international	  actors.	  	  As	  Boutros-­‐Ghali	  (1993)	  notes	  “Personnel,	  material,	  and	  technical	  and	  financial	  assistance	  are	  not	  enough	  to	  create	  a	  political	  culture	  of	  democracy”	  (329)	  and	  cultural	  acceptance	  of	  democratic	  institutions	  must	  be	  fostered	  especially	  in	  states	  lacking	  democratic	  traditions	  (Boutros-­‐Ghali,	  1993).	  	  However	  the	  question	  remains	  of	  how	  an	  international	  actor	  can	  achieve	  legitimacy	  and	  foster	  such	  acceptance	  in	  the	  institutions	  its	  builds.	  	  Bernhard	  Knoll	  (2006)	  identifies	  the	  same	  problem,	  arguing	  that	  a	  territorial	  administration	  cannot	  simply	  be	  the	  handiwork	  of	  a	  diplomatic	  process,	  but	  must	  resonate	  from	  those	  inhabitants	  under	  its	  guardianship.	  	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  this,	  an	  international	  ‘trustee’	  must	  first	  generate	  legitimacy	  through	  the	  successful	  provision	  of	  public	  services	  in	  a	  manner	  compatible	  with	  local	  ideology.	  	  Then	  ownership	  must	  be	  achieved	  through	  the	  transfer	  or	  promise	  of	  transfer	  of	  powers	  to	  local	  stakeholders	  (Knoll,	  2006).	  	  However	  as	  Roberts	  (2008)	  argues	  and	  will	  be	  shown	  in	  Kosovo-­‐specific	  literature,	  the	  simple	  transfer	  of	  competences	  to	  local	  stakeholders	  does	  not	  automatically	  confer	  legitimacy	  to	  internationally	  built	  institutions.	  	  That,	  Roberts	  argues,	  is	  dependent	  upon	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  local	  elites	  to	  whom	  power	  is	  transferred	  are	  considered	  legitimate	  by	  the	  population,	  often	  achieved	  through	  the	  provision	  of	  core	  state	  functions,	  including	  territorial	  integrity	  and	  improvements	  to	  living	  conditions	  (Roberts,	  2008).	  	  	  In	  seeking	  to	  bestow	  the	  requisite	  local	  legitimacy,	  Roeder	  and	  Rothchild	  warn	  that	  international	  actors	  should	  avoid	  privileging	  the	  former	  combatants	  in	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the	  new	  institutions	  (Roeder	  and	  Rothchild,	  2005).	  	  This	  is	  especially	  important,	  though	  more	  difficult	  to	  achieve	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  settings	  where	  the	  conflict	  developed	  along	  ethnic	  cleavages.	  	  In	  Kosovo,	  Jason	  Franks	  and	  Oliver	  P.	  Richmond	  (2008)	  found	  the	  bestowal	  of	  legitimacy	  to	  internationally	  built	  institutions	  was	  virtually	  impossible	  across	  the	  predominant	  Serb-­‐Kosovar	  ethnic	  cleavage.	  	  The	  UN	  Interim	  Administration	  in	  Kosovo	  (UNMIK)	  devoted	  great	  energy,	  early	  on,	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  local	  institutions	  –	  a	  process	  viewed	  by	  Kosovars	  as	  state	  building,	  and	  by	  Serbs	  as	  an	  infringement	  on	  Serbian	  sovereignty.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  coopting	  of	  local	  actors	  by	  UNMIK	  drew	  only	  from	  the	  Kosovar	  side	  of	  the	  ethnic	  cleavage.	  	  Franks	  and	  Richmond	  found	  this	  led	  to	  local	  elites	  “treading	  a	  fine	  line	  between	  cooperation	  with	  and	  manipulation	  of	  internationals”	  (98)	  in	  order	  to	  pursue	  ethnically	  motivated	  pre-­‐conflict	  goals,	  within	  the	  new	  framework	  of	  liberal	  institutions	  (Franks	  and	  Richmond,	  2008).	  	  In	  focusing	  on	  institutions	  in	  Kosovo,	  Elton	  Skendaj	  (2014)	  found	  that	  those	  institutions,	  which	  the	  international	  community	  transferred	  to	  local	  stakeholders	  early	  on,	  in	  accordance	  with	  Knoll’s	  (2006)	  prescription,	  displayed	  a	  high	  level	  of	  politicization	  and	  elite	  patronage.	  	  These	  two	  case	  studies	  on	  the	  liberal	  peace	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  Kosovo	  support	  the	  two	  previously	  presented	  points	  made	  by	  Roeder	  and	  Rothchild	  (2005).	  	  One,	  Skendaj’s	  conclusion	  supports	  the	  point	  that	  international	  stewardship	  should	  be	  long	  in	  duration	  to	  prevent	  the	  political	  capture	  of	  liberal	  peace	  built	  institutions.	  	  And	  two,	  Franks	  and	  Richmond’s	  (2008)	  conclusion	  supports	  Roeder	  and	  Rothchild’s	  conclusion	  that	  focus	  should	  be	  devoted	  to	  building	  lower	  level	  municipal	  institutions	  at	  the	  start	  of	  liberal	  peace	  building,	  rather	  than	  top-­‐down	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institutions	  of	  central	  administration	  that	  can	  be	  potentially	  ethnically	  exclusive.	  	  And	  what	  these	  cases	  further	  illustrate	  is	  the	  challenge	  of	  practical	  application	  of	  liberal	  peace	  building	  in	  post-­‐inter-­‐ethnic	  conflict	  settings.	  	  	  	   In	  response	  to	  the	  practical	  application	  of	  institution-­‐centric	  liberal	  peace	  building	  theory,	  the	  post-­‐liberal	  peace	  theory	  has	  emerged	  more	  recently.	  	  Championed	  by	  Oliver	  P.	  Richmond,	  he	  defines	  post-­‐liberal	  peace	  (2010)	  as	  seeking	  to	  develop	  a	  hybrid	  local-­‐liberal	  peace.	  	  This,	  he	  argues,	  centers	  on	  the	  ‘everyday’	  –	  a	  less	  formal	  concept	  distinct	  from	  civil	  society	  –	  in	  which	  local	  actors	  and	  communities	  of	  actors	  live	  and	  develop	  their	  own	  political	  strategies	  tempered	  to	  their	  cultural	  and	  environmental	  needs	  (Richmond,	  2010).	  	  Porter	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  argue	  that	  engagement	  with	  these	  local	  processes	  and	  institutional	  arrangements	  rather	  than	  the	  importing	  of	  ‘best	  practices’	  by	  external	  actors	  enhances	  institutional	  legitimacy.	  	  Conversely,	  though,	  they	  argue	  that	  failure	  to	  successfully	  engage	  with	  the	  everyday	  can	  lead	  to	  withdrawal	  of	  support	  for	  public	  authorities	  and	  a	  search	  within	  the	  everyday	  for	  means	  to	  redress	  security,	  political,	  or	  economic	  grievances	  (Porter	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  	  Similarly	  Roger	  Mac	  Ginty	  (2010)	  argues	  that	  when	  the	  domestic	  actors	  are	  marginalized	  and	  peace	  building	  dominated	  by	  the	  international	  stakeholders,	  peace	  becomes	  a	  process	  done	  to	  them	  rather	  than	  one	  they	  are	  full	  participants	  in.	  	  This	  leads	  to	  a	  focus	  on	  “ticking	  boxes,	  counting	  votes,	  and	  decommissioning	  weapons…”	  (152)	  instead	  of	  addressing	  the	  organic	  factors	  underlying	  the	  conflict	  in	  the	  first	  place	  (Mac	  Ginty,	  2010).	  	  	  Engagement	  with	  the	  ‘everyday’	  in	  the	  process	  of	  post-­‐liberal	  peace,	  however	  is	  not	  a	  guarantee	  of	  legitimacy	  or	  sustainability.	  	  In	  a	  study	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  Sierra	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90Leone,	  Gearoid	  Millar	  (2014)	  argues	  that	  given	  the	  unique	  nature	  of	  those	  ritual,	  practical,	  and	  institutional	  arrangements	  which	  define	  ‘everyday’	  engagement,	  the	  outcomes	  of	  hybrid	  institutions	  are	  unpredictable.	  	  He	  found	  this	  especially	  evident	  in	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  local	  and	  international	  conceptions	  of	  such	  notions	  as	  justice	  and	  adulthood	  were	  in	  conflict	  (Millar,	  2014).	  	  As	  this	  overview	  of	  relevant	  liberal	  peace	  and	  post-­‐liberal	  peace	  literature	  has	  made	  evident	  the	  organic	  ownership	  and	  credibility	  of	  internationally	  regulated	  institutions	  is	  paramount	  to	  the	  success	  of	  both	  liberal	  and	  post-­‐liberal	  peace	  theories.	  	  However	  as	  Millar	  (2014),	  and	  Franks	  and	  Richmond	  (2008)	  found,	  the	  practice	  of	  engagement	  with	  local	  stakeholders	  does	  not	  spontaneously	  result	  in	  successful	  institutions.	  	  Rather,	  in	  accordance	  with	  Mac	  Ginty	  (2010)	  the	  prescription	  of	  local	  stakeholder	  engagement	  in	  liberal	  peace	  building	  initiatives	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  become	  a	  box	  that	  is	  ticked	  in	  meeting	  an	  internationally	  mandated	  timeframe	  rather	  than	  a	  guarantee	  of	  ownership.	  	  	  	  
Rule	  of	  Law	  (RoL)	  	   The	  preceding	  section	  dealt	  with	  that	  literature	  related	  to	  the	  broader	  category	  of	  liberal	  peace	  intervention	  and	  exposed	  the	  themes	  of	  local	  ownership	  and	  engagement	  as	  consistent	  in	  the	  literature.	  	  This	  section	  will	  review	  relevant	  literature	  pertaining	  to	  liberal	  peace	  building	  focused	  more	  specifically	  on	  rule	  of	  law	  (RoL)	  operations	  and	  the	  liberal	  peace	  challenges	  affecting	  them.	  	  	  Firstly,	  what	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  RoL	  literature	  is	  lack	  of	  consensus	  on	  a	  definition	  of	  RoL.	  	  Yvon	  Dandurand	  (2007)	  cites	  the	  United	  Nations	  definition	  as:	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A	  principle	  of	  governance	  in	  which	  all	  persons,	  institutions	  and	  entities,	  public	  and	  private,	  including	  the	  State	  itself,	  are	  accountable	  to	  laws	  that	  are	  publicly	  promulgated,	  equally	  enforced	  and	  independently	  adjudicated,	  and	  which	  are	  consistent	  with	  international	  human	  rights	  norms	  and	  standards	  (Dandurand,	  2007:	  248-­‐49).	  	  Stromseth	  (2007)	  defines	  RoL	  as:	  	  	  A	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  which	  the	  state	  successfully	  monopolizes	  the	  means	  of	  violence,	  and	  in	  which	  most	  people,	  most	  of	  the	  time,	  choose	  to	  resolve	  disputes	  in	  a	  manner	  consistent	  with	  procedurally	  fair,	  neutral,	  and	  universally	  applicable	  rules,	  and	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  respects	  fundamental	  human	  rights	  norms.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  today's	  globally	  interconnected	  world,	  this	  requires	  modern	  and	  effective	  legal	  institutions	  and	  codes,	  and	  it	  also	  requires	  a	  widely	  shared	  cultural	  and	  political	  commitment	  to	  the	  values	  underlying	  these	  institutions	  and	  codes	  (Stromseth,	  2007:	  1449).	  	  	  	  Both	  of	  these	  definitions	  do	  address	  the	  organic	  level	  of	  society	  that	  Richmond	  (2010)	  deems	  the	  ‘everyday’,	  in	  requiring	  cultural	  commitment	  (Stromseth)	  or	  individual	  decision	  making	  (Dandurand)	  for	  RoL	  to	  be	  successful.	  	  However,	  both	  are	  primarily	  institutional	  in	  definition,	  addressing	  government	  control,	  international	  standards	  and	  norms,	  and	  laws	  and	  procedures.	  	  In	  this	  sense	  the	  ‘everyday’	  is	  overshadowed	  by	  institutional	  importance.	  	  	  As	  further	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  indicates,	  there	  is	  a	  further	  lack	  of	  consensus	  on	  what	  sectors	  of	  society	  RoL	  intervention	  is	  most	  applicable	  to.	  	  For	  example,	  Balakrishnan	  Rajagopal	  (2008)	  and	  Richard	  Sannerholm	  (2007)	  cite	  RoL	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reform	  as	  stemming	  from	  economic	  development	  and	  the	  needs	  for	  property	  and	  contract	  rights	  and	  the	  court	  as	  a	  formal	  dispute	  resolution	  mechanism.	  	  Golub	  (2007)	  prefers	  a	  social	  mode	  of	  RoL,	  arguing	  for	  its	  importance	  in	  local	  empowerment.	  	  While	  others,	  Petersen	  (2010)	  and	  Betts	  et	  al.	  (2001),	  regard	  RoL	  intervention	  as	  a	  governmental	  reform	  and	  building	  administrative	  legitimacy.	  	  	  	   Regardless	  of	  definition	  or	  societal	  sector	  addressed,	  the	  RoL	  intervention	  literature	  draws	  two	  close	  parallels	  with	  the	  liberal	  peace	  literature,	  namely:	  a	  focus	  on	  institutional	  reform,	  and	  the	  same	  conundrum	  of	  local	  ownership.	  	  Traditionally	  interventionist	  RoL	  programming	  focuses	  on	  what	  Sannerholm	  (2007)	  identifies	  as	  the	  ‘justice	  triad’	  of	  legislative	  reform,	  judicial	  education,	  and	  police	  training.	  	  More	  specifically,	  Dandurand	  (2007)	  cites	  a	  more	  robust	  prosecutorial	  office	  as	  the	  key	  to	  RoL,	  in	  line	  with	  his	  earlier	  cited	  definition	  of	  RoL	  serving	  to	  protect	  the	  population	  from	  the	  state.	  	  Acceptance	  of	  RoL,	  like	  Boutros-­‐Ghali’s	  (1993)	  conclusion	  about	  democracy,	  hinges	  on	  a	  cultural	  acceptance	  of	  the	  RoL	  principles	  as	  much	  as	  a	  political	  one	  (Chesterman,	  2005).	  	  Betts	  et	  al.	  (2001)	  suggest	  that	  the	  confidence	  in	  the	  justice	  system	  is	  of	  the	  most	  importance	  post-­‐internal	  conflict,	  when	  the	  possibility	  of	  revenge	  or	  vigilante	  violence	  is	  high.	  	  In	  such	  a	  situation,	  though,	  Sannerholm	  (2007)	  posits	  that	  confidence	  or	  trust	  in	  central	  justice	  authorities	  is	  exceptionally	  difficult,	  as	  police	  forces	  (and	  laws)	  have	  tended	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  repressive	  regime.	  	  Thus	  the	  challenge	  of	  not	  only	  local	  ownership	  of	  RoL	  institutions,	  but	  confidence	  in	  those	  institutions	  is	  very	  real.	  	  	  To	  address	  this,	  Sannerholm	  argues	  that	  sustainable	  RoL	  institutions	  are	  the	  product	  of	  locally	  owned,	  bottom-­‐up	  approaches,	  having	  already	  highlighted	  his	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qualms	  with	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  institutions	  (Sannerholm,	  2007).	  	  Stromseth	  (2007)	  also	  argues	  that	  the	  support	  of	  local	  populations	  and	  leadership	  are	  crucial	  to	  fostering	  RoL	  institutions	  that,	  most	  notably,	  will	  outlast	  the	  international	  presence.	  	  Stephen	  Golub	  (2007)	  advocates	  what	  can	  be	  classified,	  by	  Richmond’s	  (2010)	  definition,	  as	  a	  post-­‐liberal	  peace	  building	  approach	  in	  his	  endorsement	  of	  ‘legal	  empowerment’.	  	  Legal	  empowerment,	  he	  defines	  as	  an	  emphasis	  on	  directly	  strengthening	  the	  roles,	  capacities	  and	  power	  of	  the	  disadvantaged	  and	  civil	  society,	  as	  opposed	  to	  focusing	  on	  state	  institutions	  (Golub,	  2007:	  56).	  	  	  	   	  In	  seeking	  to	  foster	  RoL	  institutions	  from	  the	  organic	  level	  however	  presents	  the	  liberal	  peace	  builders	  with	  another	  serious	  challenge:	  leadership	  and	  politicization.	  	  Here	  Stromseth	  (2007)	  further	  warns	  that	  the	  short-­‐term	  interests	  that	  may	  be	  forwarded	  by	  collaboration	  with	  local	  warlords	  or	  militias	  can	  ultimately	  spoil	  RoL	  in	  the	  long	  term.	  	  And	  while	  eschewing	  “warlords”	  or	  criminal	  or	  paramilitary	  figures	  from	  the	  RoL	  process	  may	  seem	  straightforward,	  it	  can	  be	  anything	  but	  in	  post-­‐intra-­‐state	  conflict	  societies.	  	  In	  applying	  Stromseth’s	  definition	  of	  RoL	  to	  Franks	  and	  Richmond’s	  (2008)	  findings	  (identified	  in	  the	  preceding	  section),	  what	  becomes	  evident	  is	  that	  the	  coopting	  of	  only	  one	  side	  of	  an	  ethnic	  cleavage	  to	  centralized	  authority	  means	  a	  monopolization	  of	  the	  means	  of	  violence	  by	  only	  one	  ethnic	  group.	  	  The	  literature	  indicates	  a	  resulting	  proliferation	  of	  informal	  or	  parallel	  means	  of	  violence	  on	  the	  opposite	  side	  of	  the	  ethnic	  cleavage.	  	  	  Porter	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  argue	  that	  those	  not	  on	  the	  coopted	  side	  would	  seek	  to	  redress	  their	  participatory	  and	  security	  grievances	  through	  whatever	  means	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available,	  including	  violence.	  	  Kristen	  Howarth’s	  (2014)	  findings	  support	  this,	  writing:	  	  for	  those	  in	  post-­‐accord	  societies	  who	  do	  not	  benefit	  from	  a	  peace	  dividend,	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  informal	  or	  illegal	  economy,	  such	  as	  drug	  trafficking,	  gang	  violence	  and	  crime,	  illegal	  arms	  sales	  and	  prostitution	  rings,	  as	  they	  are	  the	  only	  opportunities	  available	  (268)	  	  Mark	  Duffield	  (2002)	  defines	  this	  as	  a	  rise	  in	  “parallel	  extra-­‐legal	  and	  transborder	  activity”	  (1057).	  	  And	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  facilitators	  of	  such	  activities	  are	  not	  regarded	  as	  criminal	  at	  the	  ‘everyday’	  level	  at	  all.	  	  Rather,	  he	  argues,	  “the	  leaders	  of	  terror	  campaigns	  and	  ethnic	  cleansing,	  rather	  than	  being	  criminals	  or	  manipulative	  elites,	  are	  often	  perceived	  as	  saviours	  and	  the	  protectors	  of	  the	  essential	  elements	  of	  life	  itself”	  (Duffield,	  2002:	  1060).	  	  Thus	  what	  is	  evident	  is	  that	  an	  ethnically	  divided	  society	  that	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  liberal	  RoL	  programming,	  becomes	  characterized	  by	  political	  asymmetry.	  	  On	  one	  side	  of	  the	  cleavage	  is	  the	  ethnic	  group	  coopted	  by	  the	  liberal	  peace	  builders	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  local	  ownership.	  	  On	  the	  other	  side(s)	  is	  the	  marginalized	  group,	  seeking	  to	  monopolize	  its	  own	  means	  of	  violence	  through	  ‘everyday’	  leaders	  outside	  the	  realm	  of	  centralized	  authority.	  	  Essentially	  the	  underlying	  traits	  of	  ethnic	  conflict	  continue	  to	  endure,	  without	  significant	  violence.	  	  This	  is	  a	  situation	  which	  Mac	  Ginty	  (2010)	  labels	  as	  ‘no	  war,	  no	  peace’.	  	  	  What	  the	  literature	  ultimately	  depicts	  is	  a	  trend	  in	  interventionist	  RoL	  programming	  to	  be	  inherently	  liberal,	  rather	  than	  post-­‐liberal,	  therefore	  preferring	  to	  focus	  its	  efforts	  on	  the	  centralized	  institutions,	  rather	  than	  Richmond’s	  (2010)	  ‘everyday’	  space.	  	  Golub	  terms	  this	  focus	  on	  judiciaries	  and	  ministries,	  ‘rule	  of	  law	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orthodoxy’	  (Golub,	  2007:	  48).	  	  The	  result	  of	  this,	  widely	  indicated	  in	  the	  literature,	  is	  an	  inherent	  politicization	  of	  RoL	  intervention.	  	  Stromseth	  (2007)	  concisely	  sums	  up	  the	  aforementioned	  asymmetry:	  “Promoting	  rule	  of	  law	  is	  not	  politically	  neutral,	  although	  interveners	  often	  like	  to	  imagine	  that	  it	  is.	  In	  practice,	  the	  decisions	  interveners	  make	  necessarily	  empower	  some	  local	  actors	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  others”	  (Stromseth,	  2007:	  1449).	  	  	  Jenny	  Petersen	  (2010)	  identifies	  international	  RoL	  stakeholders	  as	  striving	  to	  portray	  RoL	  programming	  as	  apolitical	  through	  images	  of	  blind,	  neutral,	  and	  democratic	  justice.	  	  Despite	  this,	  she	  argues,	  RoL	  programs	  are	  highly	  politicized	  bodies	  of	  reforms,	  characterized	  by	  illiberal	  coercive	  strategies	  designed	  at	  forcing	  RoL	  outcomes.	  	  This	  produces,	  she	  argues,	  a	  system	  in	  which	  elites	  receive	  impunity	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  stability	  (Petersen,	  2010),	  consequently	  rejecting	  neutrality	  and	  ‘blind	  justice’	  in	  support	  of	  Western	  foreign	  policy	  objectives	  (Duffield,	  2010).	  	  	  Likewise	  Rajagopal	  (2008)	  argues	  against	  the	  apolitical	  nature	  of	  RoL	  intervention,	  writing:	  	  Underlying	  this	  “linkage”	  idea	  is	  a	  desire	  to	  escape	  from	  politics	  by	  imagining	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  as	  technical,	  legal,	  and	  apolitical.	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  to	  think	  that	  failures	  of	  development,	  threats	  to	  security,	  and	  human	  rights	  violations	  could	  all	  be	  avoided	  or	  managed	  by	  a	  resort	  to	  law	  (1349).	  	  	  He	  further	  argues,	  however,	  that	  addressing	  development,	  human	  rights,	  and	  security	  is	  best	  suited	  to	  remain	  political	  processes,	  and	  thus	  RoL	  programming	  is	  also	  best	  suited	  to	  remain	  a	  political	  process	  (Rajagopal,	  2008).	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   Other	  scholars	  refute	  Rajagopal’s	  (2008)	  call	  for	  keeping	  RoL	  an	  inherently	  political	  process,	  which	  could	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  highly	  liberal	  peace	  view.	  	  Skendaj’s	  (2014)	  findings,	  for	  example,	  have	  already	  highlighted	  the	  potential	  for	  general	  ‘institution	  capture’	  and	  political	  patrimony	  displayed	  by	  local	  stakeholders	  in	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  setting.	  	  His	  findings	  further	  indicated	  an	  express	  loyalty	  to	  political	  leaders	  or	  parties	  by	  local	  actors,	  especially	  in	  the	  judicial	  system	  (Skendaj,	  2014).	  	  And	  Sannerholm	  (2007)	  agrees,	  arguing	  that	  incomplete	  RoL	  principles	  lead	  to	  a	  culture	  of	  widespread	  corruption	  and	  embezzlement	  being	  fostered.	  	  More	  troubling	  for	  RoL	  are	  Petersen’s	  (2010)	  findings.	  	  	  In	  a	  case	  study	  of	  Kosovo,	  she	  found	  a	  culture	  in	  the	  international	  RoL	  stakeholders	  of	  impunity	  for	  local	  politicians,	  which	  she	  further	  found	  to	  include	  the	  tolerance	  of	  informal	  security	  and	  intelligence	  structures,	  independent	  of	  central	  oversight	  and	  loyalty	  solely	  to	  politicians	  or	  their	  parties.	  	  This	  phenomenon	  was	  not	  observed	  strictly	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  disenfranchised	  minority	  (Serbs),	  but	  the	  Kosovar	  side	  as	  well	  (Petersen,	  2010).	  13	  	  What	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  a	  review	  of	  the	  RoL-­‐focused	  literature	  is	  that	  it	  displays	  the	  same	  problems	  as	  the	  broader	  process	  of	  liberal	  peace	  building.	  	  As	  the	  literature	  has	  demonstrated,	  RoL	  programming	  has	  focused	  more	  on	  the	  liberal	  institutional	  than	  the	  post-­‐liberal	  ‘everyday’	  space.	  	  Though	  the	  conundrum	  of	  ownership	  is	  omnipresent	  in	  the	  liberal	  peace	  literature,	  it	  is	  magnified	  in	  application	  to	  RoL	  institutions.	  	  As	  Sannerholm	  (2007)	  notes,	  those	  institutions	  of	  law	  and	  order	  were	  often	  times	  repressive	  organs	  under	  authoritarian	  regimes.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Phillips’s	  work	  identifies	  the	  Kosovo	  Information	  Service	  (ShIK)	  as	  a	  paramilitary	  intelligence	  service	  that	  remains	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  of	  Kosovo	  (PDK),	  the	  ruling	  party	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  Hashim	  Thaçi.	  	  He	  identifies	  ShIK	  as	  being	  responsible	  for	  murder,	  extortion,	  smuggling,	  and	  espionage.	  	  See,	  David	  L.	  Phillips.	  “The	  Balkan	  Underbelly.”	  World	  Policy	  Journal	  (2010).	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Thus	  in	  settings	  characterized	  by	  a	  prominent	  ethnic	  cleavage,	  instilling	  trust	  and	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  institutions	  of	  state	  monopoly	  on	  the	  means	  of	  violence	  (Stromseth,	  2007),	  is	  a	  great	  challenge	  on	  both	  sides,	  but	  even	  more	  so	  on	  the	  side	  not	  coopted	  by	  international	  actors.	  	  What	  is	  also	  present	  in	  such	  a	  setting,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  literature,	  is	  an	  inevitable	  politicization	  of	  RoL,	  a	  subject	  often	  portrayed	  by	  its	  stakeholders	  as	  apolitical	  (see	  Section	  I,	  on	  EULEX	  ‘status-­‐neutrality’).	  	  In	  Kosovo,	  even	  the	  selection	  of	  which	  legal	  code	  to	  apply	  by	  UNMIK,	  so	  courts	  and	  police	  could	  be	  begin	  to	  function,	  was	  a	  politically-­‐charged	  decision	  that	  led	  to	  the	  early	  disaffection	  of	  the	  Serb	  minority	  (Betts	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  	  
EULEX	  KOSOVO	  Peace	  building	  literature	  dealing	  with	  Kosovo	  as	  a	  case	  study	  is	  not	  rare,	  however	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  literature	  dealing	  with	  EULEX	  does	  not	  evaluate	  it	  as	  a	  liberal	  peace	  building	  operation.	  	  Studies	  already	  presented	  in	  this	  review,	  including	  Jason	  Franks	  and	  Oliver	  Richmond	  (2008),	  Elton	  Skendaj	  (2014),	  Jenny	  Petersen	  (2010),	  Betts	  et	  al.	  (2001),	  and	  Simon	  Chesterman	  (2005)	  all	  examine	  UNMIK	  or	  general	  RoL	  reform	  in	  Kosovo	  within	  a	  liberal	  peace-­‐building	  framework.	  	  Given	  EULEX’s	  denotation	  as	  the	  largest	  and	  longest	  running	  manifestation	  of	  the	  EU	  Common	  Foreign	  and	  Security	  Policy	  (CFSP),	  a	  theme	  in	  the	  literature	  has	  been	  to	  take	  EULEX	  as	  a	  case	  study	  of	  the	  constantly	  evolving	  CFSP.	  	  	  For	  example,	  Monica	  Opriou	  (2011)	  overtly	  places	  EULEX	  in	  a	  framework	  of	  the	  evolving	  foreign	  policy	  developments	  in	  the	  EU	  that	  followed	  1999,	  and	  presents	  EULEX	  as	  an	  example	  of	  changing	  foreign	  policy.	  	  EULEX,	  she	  argues,	  is	  the	  
	   22	  
archetypal	  mission	  for	  the	  region,	  as	  it	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  both	  deterring	  future	  problems	  through	  its	  presence,	  and	  signals	  the	  EU’s	  clear	  commitment	  to	  stability	  in	  the	  region	  (Opriou,	  2011).	  	  Arnold	  Kammel	  (2011)	  similarly	  posits	  that	  EULEX	  is	  clear	  manifestation	  of	  the	  EU’s	  developed	  strategic	  culture,	  currently	  embodied	  in	  the	  CFSP.	  	  In	  his	  work	  he	  presents	  all	  four	  EU	  missions	  to	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  (BiH,	  two	  to	  Macedonia,	  and	  Kosovo)	  as	  ‘whole	  of	  government’	  approaches	  that	  don’t	  just	  focus	  on	  police	  or	  judicial	  reform,	  but	  democracy,	  RoL,	  and	  human	  rights.	  	  Through	  this	  method	  of	  foreign	  intervention,	  the	  EU	  seeks	  to	  address	  three	  major	  threats	  in	  regional	  conflict,	  state	  failure,	  and	  organized	  crime	  (Kammel,	  2011).	  	  	  These	  two	  works	  also	  constitute	  rare	  cases	  in	  which	  is	  not	  the	  focus	  of	  harsh	  (though	  often	  justified)	  criticism.	  	  	  Labinot	  Greiçevci	  (2011)	  also	  evaluates	  EULEX	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  CFSP	  capabilities,	  but	  unlike	  Kammel	  (2011)	  and	  Opriou	  (2011),	  argues	  that	  it	  clearly	  makes	  evident	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  foreign	  policy	  actor.	  	  He	  labels	  EULEX	  as	  an	  exemplar	  of	  ‘handicapped	  actorness’.	  	  EULEX	  is	  capable	  of	  imposing	  decisions,	  such	  as	  agreements	  with	  Belgrade	  on	  the	  population	  and	  institutions	  of	  Kosovo,	  however	  has	  been	  unable	  to	  demonstrate	  its	  wider	  control,	  especially	  in	  the	  Serb-­‐dominated	  North.	  	  Greiçevci	  further	  argues	  that	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  EU	  to	  reach	  consensus	  on	  the	  status	  of	  Kosovo,	  and	  the	  issues	  arising	  from	  that	  has	  detracted	  greatly	  from	  its	  role	  as	  an	  international	  actor	  (Greiçevci,	  2011).	  	  	  Other	  critical	  works	  focusing	  on	  EULEX	  have	  tended	  to	  address	  its	  overall	  efficacy,	  legality	  or	  sought	  to	  make	  recommendations	  for	  its	  future	  operation.	  	  For	  example	  Nikolaos	  Tzifakis	  (2013)	  posits	  that	  EULEX’s	  policies	  have	  come	  to	  be	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characterized	  by	  a	  legitimacy	  and	  efficiency	  deficit.	  	  Dimitris	  Papadimitriou	  and	  Petar	  Petrov	  (2012)	  argue	  that	  EULEX’s	  efficacy	  was	  greatly	  curbed	  prior	  even	  to	  its	  deployment,	  by	  virtue	  of	  adopting	  a	  status-­‐neutral	  mandate	  to	  appease	  both	  Russia	  and	  the	  five	  non-­‐recognizing	  EU	  member	  states	  –	  a	  point	  also	  noted	  by	  Kammel	  (2011).	  	  Robert	  Muharremi	  (2010),	  from	  a	  legal	  perspective,	  argues	  that	  due	  to	  EULEX’s	  shift	  to	  status	  neutrality	  both	  it	  as	  an	  entity,	  and	  any	  rulings	  it	  makes	  are	  technically	  illegal	  by	  Kosovo	  law.	  	  And,	  Andrew	  Radin	  (2014)	  argues	  that	  EULEX	  has	  been	  ineffective	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  conditionality,	  stemming	  from	  a	  flawed	  assumption	  that	  EULEX	  would	  have	  been	  well	  received.	  	  Radin’s	  work	  further	  advocates	  an	  end	  to	  EULEX	  (Radin,	  2014),	  a	  theme	  commonly	  found	  in	  the	  policy	  reports	  to	  be	  presented	  in	  subsequent	  sections.	  	  	  Though	  these	  scholars	  present	  vastly	  differing	  themes,	  specific	  to	  EULEX,	  they	  do	  present	  aspects	  of	  EULEX	  that	  are	  analogous	  to	  the	  broader	  literature	  dealing	  with	  both	  liberal	  peace	  building	  and	  RoL.	  	  Namely	  Greiçevci	  (2011)	  addresses	  the	  issue	  of	  local	  ownership	  of	  EULEX.	  	  He	  argues,	  in	  accordance	  with	  liberal	  peace	  (Knoll,	  2006;	  and,	  Boutros-­‐Ghali,	  1993)	  and	  RoL	  (Sannerholm,	  2007;	  Stromseth,	  2007;	  and,	  Golub,	  2007)	  literature,	  that	  in	  order	  for	  EULEX	  to	  be	  successful	  it	  requires	  both	  local	  ownership	  and	  accountability.	  	  This,	  he	  argues,	  EULEX	  is	  devoid	  of	  in	  practice	  in	  Northern	  Kosovo,	  where	  EULEX	  continues	  to	  perform	  those	  functions	  that	  should	  be	  carried	  out	  by	  Kosovar	  central	  RoL	  authorities	  (Greiçevci,	  2011).	  	  Though	  such	  behavior	  by	  EULEX	  is	  not	  unwarranted,	  as	  Opriou	  (2011)	  notes,	  it	  is	  taking	  over	  those	  functions	  (in	  the	  North)	  that	  the	  government	  of	  Kosovo	  is	  unable	  to	  perform.	  	  Padamitriou	  and	  Petrov	  (2012)	  argue	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along	  with	  Greiçevci	  (2011)	  that	  the	  original	  plan	  of	  a	  ‘light	  mode’	  for	  EULEX,	  with	  fewer	  personnel	  more	  embedded	  in	  Kosovar	  institutions	  would	  have	  fostered	  greater	  legitimacy	  and	  ownership.	  	  This,	  however,	  had	  to	  be	  deviated	  from	  for	  political	  reasons	  (Papadimitriou	  and	  Petrov,	  2012).	  	  	  Others,	  including	  Papadimitrou	  and	  Petrov,	  identify	  those	  aspects	  of	  EULEX	  that	  liken	  it	  to	  Golub’s	  (2007)	  nomenclature	  of	  ‘rule	  of	  law	  orthodoxy’	  and	  place	  it	  within	  Stromseth’s	  (2007)	  and	  Petersen’s	  (2010)	  context	  that	  RoL	  programming	  is	  inherently	  political.	  	  Papadimitriou	  and	  Petrov	  (2012),	  argue	  that	  as	  a	  product	  of	  compromise,	  EULEX	  strives	  to	  portray	  itself	  as	  strictly	  apolitical.	  	  RoL	  literature,	  though,	  generally	  argues	  that	  RoL	  programming	  cannot	  maintain	  an	  image	  of	  blind	  or	  neutral	  justice.	  	  In	  agreement	  with	  Stromseth	  (2007),	  Muharremi	  (2010)	  argues	  that	  despite	  EULEX’s	  status-­‐neutral	  label,	  its	  de	  facto	  cooperation	  with	  Kosovar	  institutions	  privileges	  the	  Kosovar	  side	  of	  the	  ethnic	  cleavage	  over	  the	  Serb	  side.	  	  Tzifakis	  (2013)	  argues	  that	  even	  through	  its	  mission	  statement,	  EULEX	  is	  focused	  on	  strengthening	  those	  institutions	  emblematic	  of	  Kosovo’s	  sovereignty,	  challenging	  Erika	  de	  Wet’s	  (2009)	  conclusion	  that	  EULEX	  and	  UNMIK	  are	  mutually	  reconcilable.	  	  	  Status-­‐neutrality	  in	  the	  UNMIK	  framework	  is	  not	  the	  only	  contradiction	  within	  EULEX.	  	  As	  Radin	  (2014)	  suggests,	  EULEX’s	  main	  objectives	  are	  in	  conflict	  with	  one	  another.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  prioritizing	  regional	  stability	  has	  led	  to	  risk-­‐averse	  behavior,	  including	  avoiding	  transformative	  activities	  such	  as	  arresting	  popular	  political	  figures	  or	  strengthening	  RoL	  institutions	  in	  the	  North,	  that	  could	  lead	  to	  potential	  discontent	  or	  unrest	  for	  either	  Kosovars	  or	  Serbs	  (Radin,	  2014).	  	  Tzifakis	  (2013)	  similarly	  argues	  that	  EULEX	  has	  focused	  on	  accommodating	  the	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situation	  on	  the	  ground,	  and	  preserving	  stability,	  rather	  than	  instigating	  reforms	  in	  accordance	  with	  its	  mandate.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  EULEX	  has	  not	  pursued	  investigations	  or	  prosecutions	  against	  high-­‐profile	  political	  figures	  (Tzifakis,	  2013;	  and	  Radin,	  2014),	  displaying	  the	  de	  facto	  impunity	  addressed	  by	  Petersen	  (2010).	  	  	  The	  EULEX-­‐specific	  literature	  displays	  qualities	  similar	  to	  both	  the	  broader	  liberal	  peace	  building	  and	  RoL	  literature,	  despite	  differing	  focuses	  of	  the	  works.	  	  What	  can	  be	  concluded	  is	  that	  those	  challenges	  to	  local	  ownership	  and	  legitimacy,	  local	  elites,	  and	  politicization	  are	  all	  present	  in	  studies	  of	  EULEX	  in	  Kosovo.	  	  What	  the	  studies	  of	  EULEX	  further	  make	  evident	  is	  the	  effect	  that	  internal	  divisions	  within	  the	  EU	  have	  on	  its	  crisis	  management	  capabilities	  (Kammel,	  2011;	  Muharremi,	  2010;	  and,	  Papadimitriou	  and	  Petrov,	  2012).	  	  Having	  established	  a	  framework	  of	  relevant	  existing	  literature,	  this	  research	  will	  contribute	  to	  the	  base	  of	  EULEX-­‐specific	  scholarship,	  by	  examining	  EULEX	  as	  an	  international	  RoL	  intervention	  within	  the	  larger	  context	  of	  liberal	  peace	  building.	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Section III – Research Methodology and Limitations 
 
Research Methodology 
Though fifteen years removed from the formal end of hostilities between the 
Kosovar insurgency and FRY, EULEX will be examined within the framework of a post-
conflict actor, as Kosovo continues to remain a state in transition.  As demonstrated in the 
preceding section, literature on EULEX tends to evaluate it in the framework of EU 
international actor capacity.   In this research, I will place EULEX within the framework 
of a liberal peace-building actor, the literature on which is also presented in the preceding 
section.   
In order to do this, I make use of 20 qualitative interviews I conducted in 
Prishtina, Kosovo and surrounding municipalities between June and August 2014; 
primary observation of EULEX-operated trial proceedings, which I conducted in 
Prishtina during the same period; public opinion data provided by UNDP, the OSCE, and 
the UN Office on Drugs and Crime; as well as drawing on policy reports and research 
produced by civil society organizations operating inside of Kosovo.  In addition, news 
reports from regional sources will be used as supplemental information.  News sources 
include Balkan Insight, published by the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network; B92 
Radio, from Belgrade; and Radio KiM from Čaglavica, Kosovo, a Serbian language-only 
source.   
Participants were interviewed in a semi-structured setting, all in English.  The 
operational language of the EU, UN, and KFOR in Kosovo is English.  Participants from 
domestic civil society were given the option of having the interview conducted in either 
	   27	  
Serbian or Albanian through a translator, but none chose to do so.  Participants were 
asked a series of six open-ended questions regarding EULEX and RoL in Kosovo.  Given 
the numerically small participant population, and the focus on ‘experts’ in fields related 
to RoL, this research does not code interview responses as statistical data.  Rather the 
data acquired in interviews will be coded by topic of responses (i.e. ‘context’; ‘public 
opinion’; ‘cultural factors’; ‘relations w/ Serbia’).  Through this approach, the research 
will build an analytical narrative of EULEX operations inside of Kosovo and place it 
within the liberal peace-building framework.   
Information from policy reports and research, and public opinion polling, will be 
used as supplemental to the interview data.  These reports come from a variety of sources 
with varying perspectives.  Through preliminary examination of some of these reports, I 
have found a tendency to be overly and unrealistically critical of EULEX.  And in 
conclusion, these reports tend to present a number of ‘policy recommendations’ for the 
restructuring or refitting of EULEX that tend to be equally as unrealistic or ideological 
for reasons of financing, logistics, or realpolitik.  This acknowledged, they do contain a 
large amount of quality factual information.   Included are quotes and analysis from 
Albanian language sources; accessibly presented historical information regarding specific 
topics; and, public opinion data regarding specific issues gathered by the authoring 
organization.  It should also be noted that these reports are the work of either contracted 
scholars or research fellows and some have been submitted as policy review to the 
European Union itself. 
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Research Limitations 
 During my period of primary research in Kosovo between June and August 2014, 
my research was limited in a number of ways.  The first of such limitations is the time in 
which field research was conducted.  With only eight weeks in the field, the time for 
research itself was limited, especially considering that the first week was spent searching 
out potential interview participants and scheduling interviews.  Likewise research during 
the period I was on-site was limited because of domestic and European vacation practices 
and holidays.  Mid-July to mid-August is a popular time for vacation; and, the Islamic 
holiday Ramadan fell during the eight-week period as well.  As a result certain officials 
and experts were unavailable, and court proceedings were reduced during this period.   
 The other three research limitations regard the interviews themselves.  Firstly, I 
was limited in my language skills, speaking virtually no Albanian, and limited Serbian.  
While all participants chose to be interviewed in English, and many were fluent and very 
articulate, certain participants struggled with jargon.  Potentially these participants could 
have had their meaning wrongfully presented.  The second limitation has to do with 
recruitment.  I found the press office of EULEX to be exceedingly unhelpful.  After 
having numerous requests put on hold, I was instructed to submit any questions in writing 
for review.  Following this request, acting head of the EULEX press office instructed me 
not to contact them again.  While I was able to recruit EULEX participants through other 
means, this limited the population available.   
Likewise trouble was experienced in recruiting Serbs.  Both Serb politicians and 
civil society experts avoided contact and actively instructed me not to contact them again.  
As a result, my Serb perspective is limited to a single interview with a journalist 
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operating in the village of Čaglavica in the Gračanica municipality, the large Serb 
enclave outside of Prishtina.   
Lastly, due to security concerns of the Miami University study abroad program I 
was operating as a part of, I was prevented from conducting research in Northern Kosovo 
or the city of Mitrovica.  A journalist from Serbian media outlet Tanjug; a civil society 
representative from Community Building Mitrovica; and a Serb employee of UNDP in 
Zvečan, agreed to participate in interviews if I could arrange transport to the North, 
however this proved to be not possible due to safety concerns regarding current events at 
the time.  In late June, EULEX personnel removed the long-standing barrier on the main 
bridge in Mitrovica only for Serbs in the north half of the city to replace it days later.  
This resulted in violent rioting in the southern half of Mitrovica, which included cars and 
buildings being set on fire.  In late July, EULEX issued an arrest warrant for the Serb 
mayor of Zubin Potok, Stevan Vulović.  This also resulted in small-scale rioting in North 
Mitrovica and Zvečan.  Given these two events, it was agreed upon that travel to the 
North was not favorable for the academic program I was operating with.   
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Section IV – Context 
 
When EULEX inherited responsibility for reforming RoL in Kosovo, albeit by its 
own initiative, it found itself in a setting in which the post-conflict phase of the war was 
still evolving, nine years removed from the combat, or escalation, phase.14  Most notably 
Kosovo is characterized by a stark ethnic cleavage between Serbs and Kosovars that has 
exhibited few signs of diminishing following the war.  In order to understand the rule of 
law (RoL) situation and those obstacles to it, it is important to briefly review the 
historical events influencing contemporary Kosovo.   
 
Repression, War, and Aftermath 
Kosovo’s golden period, which began with the granting of enhanced autonomy in 
1974, came to an official end in July 1990 when the Kosovo assembly was dissolved.  
For years before though, its autonomy had been gradually eroding.  The rise to power of 
Slobodan Milošević saw the top Kosovar politicians replaced by his loyal supporters.  
Likewise, Kosovars were removed from the state security and justice institutions, 
including the police and judiciary.  This led to striking and subsequent rioting at the 
Trepča mining complex near Mitrovica in 1989.  The Trepča Combine constituted the 
economic heart of Kosovo and the unrest quickly spread.15  In the wake of a massive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 In their study of EU crisis management, Antonio Marquina and Xira Ruiz (2005) identify three phases of 
conflict: pre-conflict, escalation/management, and post-conflict/resolution.  They define the post-conflict 
phase as one managed by civilians without directly military threat, in which the risk of violence is still 
present, but the recurrence of war unlikely.   
15 In addition to the mines outside of Mitrovica, the Trepča Combine included a chemical research and 
production plant, a battery factory, and an ammunition factory.   
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strike in September 1990, the Serbian government laid off the bulk of the Kosovar 
workforce at Trepča, retaining only 221 of the 6,471 Kosovar employees (KSI, 2012).   
As war spread through Croatia and then Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to the 
north, Kosovo remained for the most part pacific. Following the dissolution of the 
assembly by Belgrade in 1990, parallel political structures began to arise on the Kosovar 
side and Ibrahim Rugova, a writer by trade, was elected unofficial president.  Parallel 
healthcare and education institutions were formed alongside the political ones.  Rugova 
staunchly advocated non-violence, despite the Serbian government’s seizure of Kosovar 
schools and forcing Kosovars out of virtually all public sector jobs.  To further deter 
violence, Milošević installed paramilitary leader Željko Raznatović “Arkan” and 
members of his entourage in the Kosovo government and allowed him to construct a 
paramilitary training camp outside Prishtina (Gërmia).  Despite this and Rugova’s non-
violent preaching, violent Kosovar elements had begun to emerge in the traditionally 
dissident Drenica region in central Kosovo, which was deemed a no-go zone for Serbian 
police.  In 1991 the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) had attempted to capture 
brothers Adem and Hamëz Jashari there and failed.  And it was in Drenica in 1993 that 
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was founded by, among others, Hashim Thaçi.  
Small groups of KLA volunteers were smuggled into Albania where they received 
military training (as the Jasharis had after their attempted arrest).   
KLA operations increased by 1997, as the collapse of the Sali Berisha 
government in Albania and the availability of military stores solved the KLA’s armament 
problem.16  Sporadic guerilla operations targeted at Serbian police digressed into an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The Albanian government led by President Sali Berisha collapsed financially in spring 1997 due to 
economic collapse resulting from investment in pyramid schemes.  This was accompanied by mass 
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insurgent war in 1998 following another botched attempt at capturing the Jashari brothers 
at their home in Donji Prekaz.  Following a nearby attack on Serbian police, the MUP 
and the army launched an attack against the Jashari compound that resulted in the deaths 
of both brothers and more than sixty other Kosovars.  Subsequently the KLA rapidly 
transformed from a relatively small band of guerillas to full insurgency as thousands of 
Kosovars were sent to Albania for expedited military training.   
After a year of fighting between the KLA and the FRY security forces, and a 
failed attempt by the US to broker a settlement at Rambouillet, US-led NATO 
commenced an air campaign against the FRY.  Airstrikes, commanded by US General 
Wesley Clark, targeted both military and infrastructural targets, including power plants, 
factories, and bridges in Serbia-proper.  Believing that Russia would come to Serbia’s 
aid, as it had done in a diplomatic capacity at Rambouillet, Milošević was undeterred by 
NATO’s superiority and used its campaign as a pretext to launch Operation Horseshoe – 
a mass ethnic cleansing of Kosovars.  Serbian forces, including locally-recruited 
paramilitaries, conducted mass executions and used the Prishtina-Skopje railway to 
forcibly transfer large amounts of the population.17   
By June 1999, the NATO air campaign had succeeded in dislodging Milošević’s 
security forces, which had not received the anticipated Russian support, from Kosovo and 
Norwegian and British paratroops entered Prishtina.  That same month, UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244 was passed, placing Kosovo under the administration of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
desertion from the Albanian Army and stores of weapons were made available to the under-equipped KLA 
including massive quantities of AK-47 and SKS variant rifles, mortars, and grenades.  See, Marko 
Hajdinjak. Smuggling in Southeast Europe: The Yugoslav Wars and the Development of Regional Criminal 
Networks in the Balkans (Center for the Study of Democracy, 2002). 
17 MUP used specially brought boxcars to shift massive amounts of Kosovars from Prishtina to the 
Macedonian border, which was eventually closed.  In Western Kosovo families were loaded on trucks and 
tractors and forced across the Albanian border.  See, Tim Judah. Kosovo War and Revenge (United States: 
Yale UP, 2000). 
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UNMIK.  And two months later, in August, NATO concluded a technical agreement with 
the FRY government, banning its security forces from operating within the territory of 
Kosovo, including MUP, the army, the ministry of intelligence (BIA), or any 
paramilitaries.  The NATO-led Kosovo Implementation Force (KFOR) would assume 
responsibility for Kosovo’s security.   
UNMIK, which was to assume its administrative role immediately, was divided 
into four pillars.  Pillar I: police and justice; and Pillar II: administration of the region, 
were under the direct authority of UNMIK.  Pillar III: institution building and 
democratization, was under the authority of the OSCE.  And Pillar IV: economic 
stabilization and reform, including privatization, was placed under the authority of the 
EU (Canas/NATO, 2007).  UNMIK’s work in reforming RoL was overly challenging, 
ambiguous, and controversial.  Firstly, virtually all Kosovars had been expelled from the 
police and justice system by the Milošević regime, and the Serbian MUP personnel who 
had replaced them had fled [most of Kosovo] at the end of the war, leaving experienced 
personnel severely lacking (GLPS 05/2014, 2014).  Secondly, the decision of which legal 
code to apply – contemporary Serbian or pre-1991 Kosovar– was never sufficiently 
addressed, and Kosovar judges’ application of pre-1991 law alienated the Serb minority.  
And lastly, having largely failed to initially incorporate Kosovo Serbs in the justice 
system, UNMIK relied on Belgrade to provide Serb prosecutors and judges in order to 
meet its minority thresholds.18  However parallel Serb courts continued to exist outside 
the UNMIK system in Serb dominated municipalities, while Serb judges remained scarce 
in the UNMIK justice system (KCSS, 2011). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 UNMIK established minority thresholds in the justice system, whereby no less than 15% of judges and 
prosecutors were to be of non-Kosovar ethnicity, with a minimum of 8% Kosovo Serbs. 
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In May 2001, the Provisional Institutions of Self-Governance (PISGs) were 
established under UNMIK’s authority, and the following year elections were held.  At the 
level of the new bureaucracy, the coopted locals were virtually all Kosovar.  Serbs 
resisted UNMIK and boycotted all elections held under its authority (KIPRED 8, 2008; 
KIPRED 15, 2009; KIPRED 16, 2009; and Kursani, 2014).  With the exception of 
Rugova and his party’s (Democratic League of Kosovo: LDK) leadership, the new 
Kosovar leadership came almost exclusively from the leadership ranks of the KLA.19  
This included Hashim Thaçi, who had represented Kosovo at Rambouillet and would 
become prime minister in 2010; Fatmir Limaj, who would became president of the ruling 
PDK (Democratic Party of Kosovo) and minister of transportation; Sylejman Selimi, who 
would serve as head of the Kosovo Protection Corps and then ambassador to Albania; 
Jukup Krasniqi, who became acting president of Kosovo and speaker of the assembly; 
Ramush Haradinaj, leader of the AAK Party and briefly prime minister in 2004-05; and, 
Agim Çeku, former chief of staff of the KLA who became prime minister and head of the 
Kosovo Security Force.20   
 
De Facto Partition in Kosovo 
The idea of partitioning Kosovo along the Ibar River has been suggested, but 
overwhelmingly dismissed (GLPS, 2012).  Ethnic partition, often referred to as the least 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ibrahim Rugova died of lung cancer on January 21, 2006.  Since his death the LDK has been bestowed 
with the nickname “Party of Rugova.” See, “Obituary: Ibrahim Rugova.” BBC World News, Jan. 21 2006. 
20 Agim Çeku was an artillery officer in the Yugoslav Army before the war in Croatia.  He joined the 
Croatian Army in 1991 and was one of the commanding officers of Operation Storm that retook Krajina in 
northern Croatia and displaced 170,000 Serbs in two days.  In March 1999 he resigned from the Croatian 
Army to join the KLA.  In 2006, the international community replaced the one-year serving Prime Minister 
Bajram Kosumi with Çeku, a move which angered both Serbs in Kosovo and the Serbian government in 
Belgrade.  See, Shpend Kursani "Altering the Status Quo in the Northern Part of Kosovo after the First 
Brussels Agreement." Kosovar Stability Initiative (January 2014). 
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bad solution to ethnic conflict, is founded on the transfer of population to ethnically 
homogenous locales (Kaufmann, 1996).  However as Chapman and Roeder (2007) argue, 
partition is only successful if the outcome is two (or more) ethnically homogenous 
independent states.  The partition of Kosovo between Serb and Albanian states was 
intolerable for both sides.  Firstly, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 guarantees the 
territorial integrity of Serbia, thus making the partition of its southern province into 
ethnically homogenous states, as called for under Chapman and Roeder’s (2007) model, 
illegal.  And secondly, ethnic partition within a single entity, as Kaufmann (1998) 
highlights in Cyprus, would have meant the de jure forfeiture of Kosovo by Serbia – at 
the very least in the majority of territory inhabited by the Kosovars.   
However the de jure ideology of a heterogeneous society and the de facto reality 
of separation became quickly apparent.  At the end of the NATO campaign, many of 
Milošević’s regime men and Serbs who had been resettled from Croatia or BiH fled.21  
And as the more than 800,000 Kosovar refugees, expelled by Milošević’s ethnic 
cleansing, returned from Albania and Macedonia, revenge violence targeted at the Serb 
population became widespread.  Serb property and homes were seized or razed by the 
returning refugees.22 
This round of violence was a catalyst in the ‘enclavization’ of Kosovo, but 
Dahlman and Williams (2010) found that the majority of out-migration and gravitation to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The Milošević regime resettled 15,000 ethnic Serbs in Kosovo after they were displaced from Krajina in 
Croatia during Operation Storm, which forcibly displaced 170,000 civilians in three days.  They were sent 
to Kosovo to counter balance the demographic threat of a rapidly growing Kosovar population as a result of 
higher fertility rates.  See; Corinna Metz. The Way to Statehood: Can the Kosovo Approach be a Role 
Model for Palestine (Bremen, Wiener Verlag, 2014): 43.   
22 Tim Judah (2000) writes of French KFOR troops in central Kosovo having been ordered not to stop the 
systematic looting, theft, and violence.22  He further describes how attempts by moderate Kosovar 
personalities to speak out against the violence were marginalized and labeled as ethnic-defectors. 
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Serb enclaves occurred after the March 2004 rioting.23  The facts of March 2004 are that 
two boys drowned in the Ibar River in Mitrovica.  The Kosovar media claimed that they 
were hounded into the river by Serbs with dogs, while Serbs argue that boys fell into the 
river while running from a Danish KFOR patrol after robbing a grocery store.  Rioting 
rapidly spread across the whole of Kosovo resulting in the displacement of 4,100 Serbs, 
550 Serb homes destroyed, and 28 Orthodox sites razed.  In the village of Čaglavica near 
Prishtina, US and Swedish KFOR troops were forced to defend Serb homes with live 
ammunition and sustained wounded of their own (interview with Vorgučić, Čaglavica 
2014)24.  In Mitrovica, where the rioting started, Kosovars attempted to cross into the 
Serb dominated northern section of the city, but were turned away (Kursani, 2014).  
While at the governmental level, UNMIK and the PISGs continued to profess ethnic 
heterogeneity and inclusiveness, at the social level, de facto separation was becoming a 
reality.  In short what occurred after 1999 and accelerated after March 2004 was a virtual 
un-mixing of Kosovo’s Serbs into their own enclaves. The population of Serb internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) in the North grew to outnumber the population of Serb residents 
prior to 1999 (KSI, 2012).   
The enclaves provided the Serbs with innocuous enough cultural safe havens, 
protected, along with Serbian Orthodox sites, by KFOR.25  What eventually would prove 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 A 2011 UNDP survey found that 67% of North Mitrovica’s population had moved there post-1999.  See: 
“Mitrovica Public Opinion Survey.” UNDP (March 2011).	  	  	  
24 Isak Vorgučić is the managing director of Radio KiM, a Serbian-language television station based in the 
village of Čaglavica in the Gračanica municipality.  He began working for Radio KiM as a member of at 
the monastic brotherhood based at the Serbian Orthodox Gračanica Monastery, which he has since left.  
Prior to this he served in the VJ, during which time he was stationed in Kosovo since 1993.  	  25	  Since	  the	  decentralization	  process,	  KFOR	  has	  began	  its	  “unfixing	  process”:	  	  the	  gradual	  transfer	  of	  security	  for	  religious	  and	  cultural	  heritage	  sites	  under	  KFOR	  protection	  to	  Kosovo	  Police	  responsibility.	  	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  2013,	  KFOR	  had	  unfixed	  eight	  properties	  with	  Designated	  Special	  Status:	  the	  Gazimestan	  Monument,	  Gracanica	  Monastery,	  Zociste	  Monastery,	  Budisavci	  Monastery,	  Gorioc	  Monastery,	  the	  Archangel	  site,	  Devic	  Monastery,	  and	  the	  Pec	  Patriarchate.	  	  Only	  one	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harmful, however was the creation and proliferation of parallel institutions by Belgrade in 
these enclaves after the war, outside of the UNMIK and PISG structures.  These included 
a public administration that functioned inside the larger Serbian political system; justice, 
operating in the Serbian legal system and applying Serbian law; and security, staffed by 
MUP and BIA (ministry of intelligence) personnel, in defiance of the 1999 NATO 
agreement (KIPRED 9, 2008).  The failure of central authority to first protect the Serb 
minority during the March 2004 riots, and then prosecute those responsible 
retrospectively, signaled a revitalization of the parallel system (KCSS, 2011).  In addition 
‘civilian defense committees’ were formed in the northern municipalities, technically 
unarmed, to serve as neighborhood watch-type groups (Kursani, 2014).   Receiving 
salaries from both Serbian and Kosovo governments, and many receiving a 200% salary 
from the Serbian government for ‘hazard pay’, the employees of the parallel structures 
had little incentive to abandon their positions in favor of integration into the Kosovar 
system (Interview with Rreze Duli, Prishtina 2014; and, GLPS 1/2013, 2013).26  Police in 
the North actively distanced themselves from the central Kosovo Police (KP) command 
structure in favor of operating parallel to it and remaining under the command of the 
Serbian MUP and BIA.  This left the Serbian government as the de facto sole provider of 
security in the North (BCSP/KCSS, 2014). 
The unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovar institutions in February 
2008, adamantly rejected by Serbia, changed the situation for the Serb enclaves.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  designated	  site	  –	  the	  Decani	  Monastery	  –	  currently	  remains	  under	  fixed	  KFOR	  protection.	  	  See:	  “NATO’s	  Role	  in	  Kosovo.”	  NATO,	  Aug.	  11,	  2014;	  accessed,	  November	  6,	  2014:	  http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm#	  	  
26Rreze Duli has been employed by UNDP since 2008 during which time she has worked as a director on 
the decentralization project and currently works with Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian (RAE) communities 
surrounding Prishtina.  Prior to that she worked for the European Stability Initiative and UNICEF, and in 
1999 for Mercy Corps in the refugee camps in Macedonia.   	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Especially in the North, the reconstitution of the former Mitrovica municipality 
(including the southern, Kosovar populated section of the city) was actively resisted, 
violently and politically.  Radical Serbs attacked and burned customs gates 1 and 31 on 
the boundary with Serbia at Brnjak and Jarjine; and in North Mitrovica protesters forcibly 
occupied the municipal courthouse.  The courthouse was eventually reclaimed by KFOR, 
but reopened only under the condition that it be staffed by international judges and 
prosecutors applying UNMIK law.  The customs gates would remain a contentious 
subject (KCSS, 2011).  The customs service was relocated to South Mitrovica, far from 
the boundary with Serbia.  Serb police and officials were pressured to resign from KP and 
the public administration, and sign contracts with Serbian MUP (Džihić and Kramer, 
2009; KIPRED 8, 2008).  Thus the North entered a period of virtual lawlessness.  
Criminal elements began to flourish especially in smuggling, with the lack of customs 
enforcement (KIPRED 9, 2008).   
While the Serbian government proposed ‘functional division’ of the North in a 
reactive attempt to maintain its influence, Kosovar authorities pushed forward with the 
decentralization project originally abandoned due to Serbian dissent in 2004.  The 
Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo called for both decentralization at the municipal 
level of Serb majority municipalities and the disproportionate representation of the Serbs 
in the Government of Kosovo.  Serbs were guaranteed 9% of seats in the assembly for 
roughly only 6% of the population.  The UNDP-led decentralization project, which had 
been rejected by Belgrade prior to March 2004, was carried out in 2008-09.  Six Serb 
majority municipalities were created, including North Mitrovica, north of the Ibar 
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River.27  North Mitrovica included three smaller municipalities in Zubin Potok, 
Liposavić, and Zvečan (Interview w/ Rreze Duli).  Here it is important to note the 
difference between the five southern municipalities and North Mitrovica (commonly 
designated the North).  While those in the south proved more open to integration in the 
Kosovar system, the North resisted any attempts at consociational power-sharing and 
violently resisted attempts at integration by central authorities.   
Even after the completion of the decentralization project, the Serb majority 
municipalities exhibited similar conditions to Chapman and Roeder’s (2007) qualification 
of a de facto separation, primarily in that the parallel structures of administration were 
not removed, including security.  Thus by Kaufmann’s definition, the Serb 
municipalities, “demographically separated into defensive enclaves” (Kaufmann, 1996), 
constitute a form of partition.  Having displayed sustained resistance to centralized 
authority (UNMIK, PISG, and Kosovar institutions), and having enjoyed an enhanced 
level of political and infrastructural patronage from ethnic kin in neighboring Serbia, the 
North has displayed a more pronounced level of what will be considered de facto 
partition than in southern municipalities.   
The North again demonstrated its divergence from Kosovo’s central institutions in 
July 2011, and again the customs gates 1 and 31 were the object of the Northern Serbs’ 
resistance.  The customs service hadn’t functioned in the North since independence, and 
it had become a contiguous free trade zone with Serbia.  Ignoring the advice of EULEX, 
which had advised in line with Resolution 1244 that the Government of Kosovo (GoK) 
didn’t have the authority to operate north of the Ibar River, the Government dispatched 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Serb majority municipalities south of the Ibar River are: Gračanica (south of Prishtina); Štrpce (near the 
Macedonian border); Novo Brdo, Ranilug, and Parteš (both near the eastern border with Serbia).   
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its ROSU special police units to gates 1 and 31 to enforce a reciprocal trade embargo 
with Serbia.28  Advised by Serbian officials and local mayors, parallel security structures 
were mobilized, erecting roadblocks and engaging the police (KIPRED 2012/2).  
Violence broke out with EULEX and KFOR as they attempted to remove the roadblocks.  
The violence resumed in early September 2011, when, following a EU-brokered technical 
agreement on reciprocal customs stamps, EULEX again tried to take control of the 
customs gates at the administrative boundary.  Again barricades were erected on the main 
roads and manned by mobilized networks of Serbs – many of which remained in place 
until the following February.29  Even at the urging of Serbian President Boris Tadić the 
roadblocks would not be abandoned.  A roadblock still remains in place on the main 
bridge in Mitrovica and the customs gates 1 and 31 remain the objects of violence.  The 
crossing at Brnjak was attacked again in 2012 and in September 2013, EULEX customs 
officer Audrius Šenavičius was ambushed and killed returning from the gates (GLPS 
1/2013, 2013; and, Kursani, 2014).30 
Institutionally, progress, though slow, has been made in incorporating the Serb 
municipalities.  Months after the unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 and the 
GoK’s subsequent rejection of a ‘functional division’ of the North, the Serbian 
government sponsored parallel elections in the North, the first since 1996, and formed a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Following the unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008, Serbia imposed a trade embargo 
on Kosovo, by which Serbia refused Kosovo customs stamps and continued to ship goods to North Kosovo, 
without paying customs duties.  See: “Freedom of Movement, Revisited: the Struggle to Instate Rule of 
Law and Trigger Effective Governance in the North of Kosovo.” Group for Political and Legal Studies 
01/2013 (January 2013). 
29 An agreement was reached in late October, between the Northern municipal leaders and KFOR to allow 
light vehicles to pass. No such agreement was reached for EULEX or KP (GLPS 01/2013).   
30 Lithuanian customs officer Audrius Šenavičius’ vehicle was ambushed at approximately 7:30am the 
morning of September 19, 2013 near Zvečan.  He was shot and killed by gunfire that ricocheted off the 
pavement and into the vehicle.  Police experts claimed that the attack was meant to scare the officers rather 
than kill one.  See, “Kosovo: EULEX Staff Member Audrius Šenavičius Killed near Zvecan.” InSerbia 
Network, Sept. 19 2013.  
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45-member assembly (GLPS, 2012).  As they had done during the UNMIK-period 
elections, Northern Serbs continued to boycott Kosovo elections at the local and national 
level.  But while Northern Serbs continued to boycott elections until November 2013, 
other municipalities began to participate earlier.  As early as 2009, Serb turnouts in 
Gračanica, Ranilug, and Štrpce were higher in the Kosovo elections than the parallel 
elections sponsored by Belgrade.  In Parteš and Novo Brdo, as well as the northern 
municipalities, parallel actors used intimidation to deter participation.  Violence and 
verbal threats of violence or loss of financial benefits from Serbia were targeted at both 
those candidates hoping to run in the Kosovo elections, as well as the general population 
to deter them from voting.   In Zvečan (in the North) the Union for European Future, a 
certified political party withdrew, from the 2009 elections after hand grenades were 
thrown at its leader’s home, and Northern Serb leaders threatened larger-scale retaliatory 
violence for participation in elections (KIPRED 15, 2009; and, KIPRED 2010/5, 2010).  
An upsurge in violence occurred in the lead up to the 2010 Kosovo election in the North 
especially, targeted at political activists of all ethnicities with links to Prishtina.  Serb 
Independent Liberal Party leader Petar Miletić was shot in the legs; Kosovar activist 
Hakif Mehmeti was murdered; Serb NGO leader Momčilo Arlov’s car was burned; and 
shortly before the election in December two Bosniak government officials were fatally 
attacked (EU EEM, 2011). Courthouses in the north remained either non-functioning or 
under the umbrella of the larger Serbian legal system (Kursani, 2014).   
 Serb participation continued to grow following 2009, as Serb leaders defiant of 
Belgrade, such as Rada Trojković, Ranđel Nojkić, and Vuk Drašković became more 
popular in the southern municipalities, and moderate Oliver Ivanović in the North 
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(KIPRED 15, 2009).  In Parteš, which had been heavily subjected to intimidation by 
parallel actors in 2009, 65% voter turnout was recorded, in Kosovo national elections in 
2010.  And in Štrpce, in 2010, the newly elected mayor Branislav Nikolić expelled the 
parallel structures, and the administration elected in the Belgrade-sponsored 2009 parallel 
elections quietly stepped down (KIPRED 2010/5).  Likewise, support for Belgrade 
declined south of Ibar for practical reasons.  Attempts by the Serbian Coordination Center 
of Kosovo, based in Gračanica, in 2008 to consolidate full support for Belgrade’s policies 
in Kosovo failed as southern Serb municipal leaders feared they were being marginalized 
for political reasons (KIPRED 9, 2008).  Serbs in those five municipalities feared 
Belgrade’s willingness to sacrifice them in order to partition the North, and further 
resented the North’s ‘privileged’ status.  The southern municipals enjoy neither the 
political backing nor financial support from Serbia that the North does (Džihić and 
Kramer, 2009).   
The year 2013 proved to be momentous in the integration of the Serbs into central 
institutions.  The Brussels Agreement, reached in April 2013, (to be presented in depth in 
analysis sections) between Prishtina and Belgrade and brokered by the EU allowed for 
the formal creation of the ZSO KiM31, an official association of Serb municipalities, and 
began to systematically incorporate Serbian MUP personnel operating in the parallel 
security system into the Kosovo Police.  Then in November 2013, all Serb majority 
municipalities, including those in the North participated in the municipal elections.  
However, despite the considerable progress achieved during 2013, it is important to note 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Zajednica Srbine Opštine Kosova i Metohije: Community of Serb Municipalities of Kosovo and 
Metohija. 
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the dangers associated with those developments that constitute a degree of political 
detachment.   
The ZSO KiM represents a unified Serb political entity, removed from the central 
system, with the power to make legally binding decisions.32  Thus there is the danger of 
this entity being ‘captured’ by Serb radicals in either the North or Serbia proper, still 
exhibiting influence over the Kosovo Serbs.  This is especially true when considering that 
in the November 2013 elections, the Lista Srpska party won control of all but one Serb 
majority municipality.33  Based in Belgrade, Lista Srpska is a Serb interest party led by 
former pro-Serbia activists and parallel system employees.  Its consolidation of power, is 
a means by which the Serbian government can exercise virtually uniform control over the 
Serb municipalities (Interview w/ Rreze Duli, Prishtina 2014; interview w/ Ilir Deda, 
Prishtina 2014; and, Kursani 2014).34   
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 The Government of Kosovo cannot annul municipal acts - legislative or executive - even if they are not 
in line with Kosovo law or with the Constitution. In such cases, the Government may request that the 
municipality re-examines such decisions or acts (KIPRED 2010/5 (July 2010): 6). 
33 See; “Members of all Belgrade-based parties in Kosovo elections". Radio B92 (Nov. 2010).  For election 
assembly election results see; “IZBORI ZA SKUPŠTINU KOSOVA 2014.” Republic of Kosovo Central 
Election Commission (2014). 
34 Lista Srpska demonstrated conflicting loyalties between authorities in Prishtina and Belgrade in February 
2015.  At the beginning of the month Serb Minister for Returns and Communities Aleksandar Jablanović 
was dismissed from the Government of Kosovo after his comments about violent Kosovar protesters on 
Orthodox Christmas sparked large-scale, and violent protests in Prishtina.  Following his dismissal Lista 
Srpska ceased its participation in the Government of Kosovo and opened a period of consultation with 
authorities in Belgrade.  This will ultimately determine if Lista Srpska will resume its participation in the 
Government of Kosovo.  See, Una Hajdari. “Kosovo Serb MPs to Consult Belgrade Before Quitting.” 
Balkan Insight, Feb. 16 2015. 	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Section V – Analysis: EULEX and the Politicization of Rule of Law 
 
This section will analyze data collected during the interview process in Kosovo in 
2014 pertaining to the politicization of rule of law (RoL).  Relevant literature reviewed in 
Section II indicates an inherent politicization of interventionist RoL programming as a 
facet of the liberal peace theory.  Despite RoL stakeholders’ desires to portray RoL 
programming as apolitical and the vehicle of blind justice, the creation of institutions as a 
part of liberal peace building theory naturally privileges a coopted group, while 
marginalizing another (Stromseth, 2007), and is often achieved through illiberal, coercive 
means (Petersen, 2010).  The narrative will be divided into two sub-sections pertaining to 
the two most prominent themes of RoL politicization identified in the interview process: 
the role of ethnic elites and the role of political dialogue.   
 
Ethnic Elites 
As was addressed in the context section of this paper, the end of the insurgent war 
in 1999 signaled a shift in the geographic and political structure of Kosovo.  Having been 
officially ruled by ‘regime men’ from Belgrade, without the input of Kosovars, the 
situation reversed under UNMIK, and those previously parallel, underground Kosovar 
political structures emerged as the legitimate provisional government institutions 
(PISGs).  On the opposite side of the cleavage, those Serb structures that had been 
official under the Milošević regime became parallel and illegal (by the NATO agreement 
in August 1999).  Drawing from the already presented scholarship of Franks and 
Richmond (2008), the ‘ethnicization’ of institutions became readily apparent under 
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UNMIK.  Thus a system was born in which both sides’ elites were deemed legitimate by 
their own group, and illegitimate by the other, contributing to stark institutional partition.   
Despite the readiness of the elites on the Kosovar side of the ethnic cleavage to be 
coopted into the institutions of liberal peace, that has not been synonymous with a 
conformance to RoL standards.  Organized crime, corruption, and political interference 
are all present in central institutions.  Those elites that are both popular and powerful in 
post-war Kosovo have had and continue to have direct ties with organized crime 
(Interview with Avni Mazrreku, Prishtina 2014)35, and perhaps more importantly the 
KLA, which continues to be a powerful interest group in Kosovo (Interview w/ EU 
Official; and, Interview with UN official, Prishtina 2014).36  As a result, elites tread a fine 
line between resistance to and compliance with EULEX’s RoL programming.   
On the one side, advancing the aims of RoL reform is highly detrimental to the 
cohabitation of organized crime and corruption with state organs.  Ultimately this means 
political parties consenting to strengthening the organs to prosecute their members and 
possibly leaders (Interview w/ Armend Muja, Prishtina 2014).37  Consequently there is a 
lack of legitimate political will for RoL reform (Interview with Venera Hajrullahu, 
Prishtina 2014),  and the notion endures that the Government of Kosovo (GoK) and 
EULEX are “partners in peace, but enemies in justice” (Interview with Deda).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Dr. Avni Mazrreku is currently a professor of European integration at ISPE, an independent university in 
Prishtina.  Prior to this position he worked as a political advisor for the Prime Minister’s office under 
UNMIK.  He earned his PhD in European integration at the University of Bremen. 35 UNODC findings 
support Dr. Mazrreku’s corruption claims, indicating that on average 11% of Kosovo’s population 
experiences having to bribe a public official yearly.  See, “Corruption in Kosovo: Bribery as Experienced 
by the Population.” UNODC (2011); and, “Business, Corruption, and Crime in Kosovo: The Impact of 
Bribery and Other Crime on Private Enterprise.” UNODC (2013). 
36 These participants have chosen to remain confidential. 
37 Armend Muja is currently a PhD candidate and lecturer on political economy.  In 2007 he served as a EU 
integration consultant and has also worked as a communication specialist for UNDP.  He holds an MA in 
economics from the London School of Economics.	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The lack of concrete political will has been evident during proceedings brought 
against former KLA personnel.  Few cases have been brought against former KLA 
fighters or their families (Interview with Vorgučić).38  When EULEX opened both 
corruption and war crimes proceedings against former KLA commander, minister of 
transport, and PDK leader Fatmir Limaj, there was uproar from both the public and 
central authorities that EULEX was persecuting Kosovo’s heroes (interview with UN 
official, Prishtina 2014; and, GLPS 05/2014, 2014), who by being tried are martyred in 
the public view (Interview with Valdete Idrizi, Prishtina 2014).39  The same outcry 
resulted from the arrest of former KLA-fighters in connection with the Drenica Group 
case in 2013.40  In the midst of this trial and that against Fatmir Limaj, the Kosovo 
assembly overwhelmingly voted for an end to EULEX (GLPS 05/2014, 2014).  Though 
this was never realized in binding legislation, what it demonstrated is a public impunity 
of party members and former-KLA fighters, who capitalize on this distinction when 
beneficial.  With the exception of the LDK, the party of Ibrahim Rugova, the prominent 
Kosovar political parties are dominated by former KLA leadership drawing almost 
exclusive regional support (see Section VI).  For example, the Alliance for the Future of 
Kosovo (AAK) led by former KLA commander and Prime Minister, Ramush Haradinaj, 
consistently enjoys the bulk of its support from the Dukagjini region in western Kosovo 
(Interview with Muja).  KLA leaders have thus managed to revitalize their dwindling 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 There is perception that most KLA veterans and their families still possess weapons from the war, and a 
general fear of these people persists.   
39 Valdete Idrizi is director of CiviKos, a civil society platform in Prishtina, coordinating 140 civil society 
organizations.  She has managed CiviKos for three years.  Originally from Mitrovica, prior to CiviKos, she 
founded and managed Community Building Mitrovica.  
40 The Drenica Group trial regards war crimes perpetrated at a KLA-run detention camp in central Kosovo.  
Charges include the execution, torture, and mal-treatment of non-Kosovar and Kosovar collaborators with 
the Serbian authorities.  Sami Lushtaku, mayor of Skenderaj, and Sylejman Selimi, ambassador to Tirana 
are both on trial in the case.   
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influence, through attaining legitimate political positions, and hiding behind the impunity 
of their KLA pasts (Interview with UN Official, Prishtina 201441; and, interview with 
Korab Sejdiu, Prishtina 2014).42 
Despite the lack of political will present for RoL reform, the elites tread a fine 
line, and it is far more beneficial for them to cooperate with the international presence 
than resist it.  Politicians remain convenient and submissive partners to the international 
community, in exchange for being legitimized, which they gain considerably from 
(Interview with Florina Duli, Prishtina 2014).43  The 2010 elections, which resulted in 
PDK becoming the ruling party, were surrounded by serious discontent.  Both the initial 
December election and January repeat election were avidly contested by all parties other 
than the victorious PDK.  In certain locations traditionally loyal to the KLA and PDK, 
voter turnouts were reported as high as 147%, and despite acknowledging ‘flaws’ in the 
process the international community deemed the elections a success (EU EEM, 2011).44  
Furthermore US and EU officials hailed the victors as heroes comparable to those of the 
American revolution, while ignoring indications of corruption in the interest of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 This participant has chosen to remain confidential. 
42 Korab R. Sejdiu is a partner at Sejdiu and Qerkini Law Firm in Prishtina.  He holds a law degree from 
Widener University School of Law and an undergraduate degree in international business from the College 
of New Jersey.  He is barred in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.  Mr. Sejdiu returned to Kosovo 
in 2007 and worked as a legal advisor for the President on constitutional issues.  He started with the firm in 
2011.  	  
43 Florina Duli is currently the director of the Kosovar Stability Initiative (IKS).  She began work for IKS in 
2012 having previously worked for DFID as a policy advisor in the fields of governance, public 
administration, rule of law, security, civil society, and elections.  Ms. Duli participated in the evaluation of 
the EULEX mandate by the European Court of Auditors.   
44 Prior to the election, the ruling PDK used its position of power in the existing government to achieve an 
advantage including, shortening the campaign period, favorably disproportionate media coverage, and 
reallocation government funds without budgetary approval.  This included both funding municipal 
campaigns and increasing teachers’ salaries and thus securing their vote.  During the voting process, 
conditional voting was allowed – the practice of a non-registered voter being permitted to vote if he/she 
presented valid ID – a common practice in post-conflict settings.  Reported voter turnout in Skenderaj and 
Gllagovac was double what it had been during the previous municipal election and at one polling station in 
Skenderaj, ballots outnumbered signatures on the voting list.  See, “Final Report.” European Union 
Election Expert Mission in Kosovo BENF 2009 lot nr. 7 (2011).   
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‘business of government’.45  The international community has rewarded leadership loyal 
to it and its policies, therefore making local government more accountable to the 
international community than the population (Interview with Mazrreku; and, interview 
with Fisnik Korenica, Prishtina 2014).46  What this case and others like it, including the 
unconditional international backing of Haradinaj during his trial at the ICTY47, have 
allowed for is the time necessary for the entrenchment of a neo-patrimonial system in the 
upper echelons of government (Interview with Florina Duli, Prishtina 2014; and, 
interview with Muja). 
This has led to a consolidation of power by political parties and a resurgence of 
power in the former-KLA loyal to them.  The former leadership of the KLA is strong in 
politics, garnering unconditional loyalties from those parties it is represented in 
(Interview w/ Korenica). Patrimonial practices have seen former-KLA members 
implanted in the broader justice system, in which political interference has been reported 
to have increased since the 2010 elections.  Concerns have been expressed by Kosovo’s 
interior minister, Bajram Rexhepi, over consistent telephone calls to law enforcement and 
justice authorities by high level officials and deputies, interfering with proceedings 
(KIPRED 1/14, April 2014).  The justice system lacks protective mechanisms against 
such interference (GLPS 05/2014, 2014; and KIPRED 2010/8, 2010).  And given 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 This was a quote from US Ambassador Christopher Dell following the 2010 election process, in which 
he urged political parties to accept questionable results and get on with governing.  See, “Final Report.” 
European Union Election Expert Mission in Kosovo BENF 2009 lot nr. 7 (2011): 56. 
46 Fisnik Korenica is the executive director of the Group for Legal and Political Studies in Prishtina.  His 
work focuses on institution building in post-conflict areas and constitutional design.  He has been focusing 
on this for 7 years in Kosovo. 
47Ramush Haradinaj was tried at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for 
the persecution and poor treatment of the non-Albanian population of Kosovo during the war.  He 
surrendered to the court after 100 days as Prime Minister of Kosovo.  He was acquitted in both 2008 and 
the retrial in 2012.  Key witnesses to the prosecution died in accidents before the trial began.  His release 
enraged Serbian commentators.  See, Fatmir Aliu and Marija Ristić. “Kosovo Welcomes Haradinaj’s 
Release, Serbia Complains.” Balkan Insight (May 11, 2012) 
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Kosovo’s current economic plight, the fear of losing office is high amongst civil servants, 
de-incentivizing resistance to patrimonial pressures (Interview with EULEX 
Strengthening Official, Prishtina 2014).  The result is a general inability and 
unwillingness of local RoL institutions to handle difficult cases, due both to the issues of 
old loyalties and the obvious effect of intimidation or the perceived threat of it (Interview 
with Sejdiu; and, interview with EU official). In cases where EULEX handles the 
proceedings executively, direct top-down interference in the justice system is witnessed 
(Interview with EULEX Executive official, Prishtina 2014).48  Friends and families of 
elites or former-KLA go largely untried, and in those cases when they do, cases are 
brought by agreement with political parties (Interview with Albulena Sadiku, Prishtina 
2014).49 
In summation, it can be concluded that on the Kosovar side of the ethnic cleavage, 
political will for RoL building is weak, due to a seamless interaction between public 
administration and criminal and patrimonial practices.  However, elites on this side of the 
cleavage continue generally to support limited EULEX programming in exchange for 
being legitimized by the international stakeholders.  This has led to the entrenchment of a 
culture of neo-patrimony, corruption, and ultimately political capture in the justice 
system.   
On the Serb side of the ethnic cleavage the opposite holds true in terms of 
legitimization of elites, but the result is the same: the institutional entrenchment of 
criminal practices, counter to RoL principles.  As was demonstrated earlier, even before 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 This participant has chosen to remain confidential. 
49 Albulena Sadiku is a project manager at the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) office in 
Prishtina.  She has experience with civil society organization and election monitoring, and is a certified 
school instructor.  She is currently pursuing a higher degree in political science at the University of 
Prishtina. 
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the unilateral declaration of independence and the arrival of EULEX, the Serbs, and 
especially those in the North, were highly resistant to centralized RoL.  UNMIK’s limited 
reach allowed for the creation and entrenchment of parallel structures of education, 
health, administration, and security.  This included a court system that was part of the 
larger Serbian system, which employed the Serbian legal code.  This, coupled with a 
general failure of RoL to provide security to the Serb population after the war, resulted in 
a divergent RoL system and a general space of lawlessness (Interview with Mazrreku; 
and, Forum for Security, 2011).   
In contrast to the prevailing mode of legitimization on the Kosovar side, Serb 
elites are publicly legitimized through active and open resistance to centralized law, 
which post-2008 means EULEX.  As EULEX was deployed under status neutrality of 
UN Security Council Resolution 1244, its de facto cooperation with and participation in 
those central justice institutions emblematic of statehood has constituted a betrayal of the 
‘Six-Point Plan’ with Serbia and the Serbs.  EULEX is seen, rightly, as aiding in the 
development of strong centralized institutions, emblematic of Kosovo’s statehood.  As a 
result it is viewed as an organization building independence (Interview with Deda; 
interview with Idrizi; interview with Korenica; interview with Florina Duli; and, 
interview with Sadiku).  Consequently EULEX has become the most despised entity in 
the North of Kosovo, where it is seen as a group of political thugs carrying out a mission 
on the Kosovar government’s behalf (GPLS 01/2013, 2013).  EULEX personnel are 
confined to armored vehicles and their secure compounds, and require close-quarter 
protection, thus drastically limiting their ability to function (Interview with UN official; 
and, interview with EULEX Strengthening Official).  The resulting tactics, including 
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military-style operations with armored vehicles and long-barreled weapons, only 
compounds the general disdain for EULEX (Interview with EU official; and, interview 
with UN official).  These opinions are corroborated by public opinion data collected by 
UNDP.  In July 2010 only 12% of Serbs in Mitrovica reported trusting EULEX, a 
number which dropped to below 7% by that November.  And in a 2013 UNDP survey, 
only 11% of Serbs reported satisfaction with EULEX, though it constituted a drastic 
increase from the 1% reported in 2012, in the wake of the 2011 violence over customs 
gates 1 and 31. 
This highly negative perception in the North legitimizes those who openly resist 
or defy EULEX, even through overtly harmful criminal activity.  Criminal interests in 
smuggling and money laundering are high in the North, and those figures in running them 
hold considerable power, and in no way benefit from an extended reach of EULEX 
(Interview with Deda; KIPRED 2012/02, 2012; and, Forum for Security, 2011).  It was 
these criminal figures who organized and mobilized Northern Serbs to man the barricades 
in the 2011 unrest, and continued to encourage attacks on EULEX and on KFOR 
attempts to successfully operate customs gates 1 and 31 (Kursani, 2014).  However, 
despite the open and violent resistance to EULEX, coupled with criminal gains, EULEX 
itself states it does not wish to go against the will of the people in the North (KIPRED 
1/13, 2013).   
By resisting EULEX for their own criminal interests these figures become patriots 
or heroes for the Serbs.  Pursuing criminal investigations against them constitutes 
EULEX attacking Serb patriotism.  The EULEX case against Oliver Ivanović provides a 
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strong example.50  Well respected by Kosovar authorities (Interview with Vorgučić), 
Ivanović was seen as too moderate and conciliatory in the North.  However following his 
arrest and imprisonment by EULEX, his support among Northern Serbs suddenly swelled 
as they saw him as a patriotic martyr in EULEX’s ‘Serb hunt’ (Interview with EU 
official; interview with UN official; and, interview with Sadiku). 
Two factors contributing to the proliferation of these elites are cross-border ties to 
Serbia and the information asymmetry between Northern Kosovo and Kosovo south of 
the Ibar River.  Firstly, for those criminal figures in the North, the practice of VAT (value 
added tax) fraud through the use of unauthorized smuggling routes provides considerable 
financial incentives for those figures to stay in power on either side of the 
border/boundary with Serbia.51  Similarly cross-border ties have provided enhanced 
means to resisting EULEX.  The armed quasi-militias that manned the barricades in 
2011, and the ‘Bridge Watchers’ in Mitrovica have been organized, materially supplied, 
and politically represented by forces inside of Serbia proper.  These provide further tools 
for already incentivized elites to resist EULEX’s reach.  And secondly, there is the issue 
of information.  It is a simple, yet damaging fact that those in power control the limited 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Oliver Ivanović was arrested by EULEX in January 2014 on suspicion of carrying out war crimes in 
1999 and a murder in 2000 while leader of the “Bridge Watchers”.  Ivanović’s charges were not made 
public and he was held in pretrial detention until August 2014.  In January 2015, Ivanović was accused in 
EULEX trial of leading a paramilitary group in the 1998-99 conflict that evicted Kosovars from their 
homes and carried out executions.  He was identified by a witness who claimed to positively identify 
Ivanović from karate competitions.  Additionally, as a leader of the “Bridge Watchers” in 2000, Ivanović is 
accused of leading paramilitary group to evict Kosovars from North Mitrovica.  Ivanović and his defence 
refute these accusations and have called into question the credibility of the witness statements against him.  
See, “Oliver Ivanović Indicted for War Crimes in Kosovo.” Balkan Insight, Aug. 13, 2014; Una Hajdari. 
“Kosovo Serb Politician ‘Led Deadly Police Squad’.” Balkan Insight: Balkan Transitional Justice, Jan. 21, 
2015; and, Marija Ristić. “Belgrade Urges Kosovo Serb Leader Ivanovic’s Release.” Balkan Insight: 
Balkan Transitional Justice, Jan. 28 2015. 
51 In 2005, the Serbian government passed a law, removing value added tax from goods shipped to 
Northern Kosovo in an attempt to make them more affordable to the Serb population there.  The practice of 
these goods leaving Serbia without paying the VAT, only to return again without paying VAT using 
unmarked crossings has become common.  See, GLPS 01/2013, 2013. 
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flow of information in the North (Interview with Korenica). Formal education in the 
North is sub-standard by Kosovo’s standards and the population formulates views from 
information provided to them, often from political parties inside Serbia (Interview with 
EU official; and, interview with Furtuna Sheremeti, Prishtina 2014).52  The result is 
limited knowledge of integration initiatives or the illiberal figures the population 
legitimizes.   
It can be determined that EULEX is a catalyst of the legitimization of illiberal 
elites on both sides of the ethnic cleavage.  On the Kosovar side, its tolerated presence in 
institutions legitimizes the ruling elites through international plaudits, while allowing 
systems of neo-patrimony to capture those justice institutions it aims to reform.  On the 
Serb side, resistance to its liberal peace programming patriotically legitimizes elites 
whose personal gains are enhanced by a general lack of RoL.  These same elites play a 
crucial role in the political dialogue presented in the proceeding sub-section, a process 
with further systematically legitimizes and entrenches their positions. 
 
Political Dialogue 
As was made evident in the section reviewing literature relevant to liberal peace, 
RoL, and EULEX, the practice of international RoL programming is inherently political, 
despite stakeholders’ attempts to portray it as a vehicle of blind and neutral justice.  As 
Papadimitriou and Petrov (2012) highlight, EULEX was forced to adopt a status-neutral 
approach to Kosovo and therefore operate outside of independent domestic institutions, 
achieving what they refer to as becoming ‘depoliticized’.  However the alternative mode 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Furtuna Sheremeti is the head of the legal office and coordinator of the court monitoring team at the 
Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) in Prishtina.  She holds a law degree from the University 
of Prishtina and a MA in criminology from Oxford University. 
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of operation they present is that EULEX had to thus build consensus on RoL 
(Papadimitriou and Petrov, 2012), and EULEX itself has professed a wish not to act 
against the will of the Kosovo Serbs (KIPRED 1/13, 2013).  What has become evident 
since EULEX’s arrival is that building consensus on RoL, so as to be amenable to both 
sides of the ethnic cleavage is a highly political process, which at times contradicts the 
principles of RoL.   
In addition to executive and strengthening functions, the EULEX mission 
statement contains a provision for facilitating and supporting the EU-led Prishtina-
Belgrade dialogue (EULEX KOSOVO Basic Facts).  The first sequence of dialogue, 
which ran from March 2011 to October 2012, was intended to conclude strictly technical 
agreements.  Issues addressed included: civil registry books, freedom of movement, 
customs stamps, cadastral records, university diplomas, regional representation (in the 
Balkans and Europe), and integrated border/boundary management (IBM) (KIPRED 
2/13, 2013).  The EU and EULEX had made the conscious decision to engage only with 
technical aspects in Kosovo, and strictly avoid political ones, especially in the North, 
where engagement with non-technical structures had proven unsuccessful (Interview with 
EU official).  However this proved a flawed strategy.  During and following the technical 
dialogue, attempts to implement its conclusions in the North devolved into violence.  
Parallel political and security structures were behind the engagements with Kosovar and 
international authorities.  And EULEX’s attempts to implement the technical customs 
stamps and IBM agreements in September 2011 directly resulted in the resurgence of 
violence.  Parallel structures prevented EULEX from moving freely in the North, despite 
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Serbian President Tadić’s calls to desist.53  Ultimately this period of technical 
agreements, which consciously avoided local political backing, caused the North to 
further diverge from the central authorities in both Prishtina and Belgrade (GPLS 
01/2013, 2013; and, Kursani, 2013).   
It became clear from the technical agreements, and the violence that resulted from 
attempting to implement measures denoted as ‘technical’ that the EU could not remain 
averse to political or ‘non-technical’ engagement.  This was especially true as related to 
the supposedly technical issue of integrated border/boundary management (IBM).  For 
the Northern Serbs this ‘technical’ issue had serious political ramifications.  One, it 
further severed Kosovo from Serbia.  And two, increased competency in IBM would 
undoubtedly be detrimental to those ethnic elites legitimized by smuggling (Interview 
with Korenica).  As a result, the IBM issue was transferred to the agenda of the political 
dialogue, which commenced in October 2012 and remains ongoing (GLPS, 03/2013).   
The “First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations” 
(hereafter Brussels Agreement) was concluded on April 19, 2013 as the first product of 
the political dialogue.  In addition to the official creation of the Community of Serb 
Municipalities (ZSO KiM; addressed in Section IV), the Brussels Agreement profoundly 
influenced the development of RoL in the North in two respects.  Firstly, it acknowledges 
the existence of a single police force in Kosovo, the Kosovo Police (KP), and allows for 
the integration of Serbian MUP personnel employed in the parallel security structures in 
the North into the KP. The review of MUP personnel was left up to the Government of 
Kosovo (GoK), and eventually 285 former MUP officers were transferred to the KP, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 The mayors of the Northern municipalities concluded an agreement with NATO allowing its light 
vehicles to pass the roadblocks in October 2011, but refused to extend the deal to EULEX or KP.   
	   56	  
increasing Serb representation in the KP to 12.6%.  An additional 10 MUP personnel 
were rejected during the verification process upon discovery that their permanent 
residences were declared in Serbia proper.  Those selected for the KP are to be paid 
solely by the GoK, and receive no parallel funding from the Serbian government 
(BCSP/KCSS, 2014).  The integrated MUP officers are possessed of better training than 
their existing KP counterparts, and command considerably more respect in Serb majority 
municipalities.  Those Serbs employed by KP prior to the Brussels Agreement were 
regarded as second-class citizens, and their authority largely discounted (Interview with 
EU Official; and, interview with UN Official).   
The second development produced by the Brussels Agreement is the provision 
that the regional commander of KP North will always be a Kosovo Serb proposed by the 
ZSO KiM and approved by both Belgrade and Prishtina (BCSP/KCSS, 2014).  This 
constitutes a highly political development in RoL, by which the Government of Kosovo 
in Prishtina has conceded power in its own RoL matters to a foreign government.  This 
was made evident in the first appointment of KP North commander following the 
Brussels Agreement.  Nenad Đurić was appointed commander, having already been a KP 
employee who had twice been dismissed from KP service since 2011 – first for refusing 
to confiscate Serbian registration tags on vehicles in the North, and again for allowing 
Serbian officials to cross into Kosovo against government orders.  He was further 
suspected of relations with underground figures including Zvonko Veselinović (KIPRED 
4/13, 2013).54  Upon his appointment, the former KP commander, and now member of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Zvonko Veselinović was wanted by both NATO and EULEX for organizing attacks in summer and fall 
2011 that led to the death of a KP officer and wounded KFOR personnel attempting to remove the 
roadblocks.  He and his brother Zarko were believed to be principle funders and suppliers of the parallel 
quasi-militias and members of the “Bridgewatchers”.  The operation to arrest him in 2012 was typical of 
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the assembly, stated that Đurić had always faithfully served the Serbian parallel 
institutions (Kursani, 2014).  Officially, Đurić and those to come after him as KP North 
commander report to Prishtina, but in reality retain lines of communication for the 
Serbian minister for Kosovo and Metohija.  The commander’s concerns are 
communicated up the line to the Serbian government, and in turn addressed in the 
political dialogue, thus requiring political consensus on disputed operational RoL issues 
(Interview with EU official).  EULEX and KP’s ability to act in the North thus hinges on 
political consensus.   
The Brussels Agreement has boosted both the operational capacity and public 
perception of the KP Northern Command.  Since April 2013 it has improved from 
handling mainly petty crimes and relying on EULEX to handle cases of any magnitude, 
to handling serious police work, including intelligence-based policing. In achieving this, 
however, power in RoL matters in the North has been devolved to both Belgrade and the 
ZSO KiM. Thus the primary and secondary effects of the political dialogue are the 
increase in RoL capacity in the North and the political empowerment of the ZSO KiM 
and Belgrade in RoL fields, respectively.   
In order for the dialogue to continue to be productive the prioritization of the 
preservation of stability has been exhibited as a tertiary effect – a philosophy rarely 
reconcilable with organic RoL principles (Interview with Muja).  This premium on 
stability has been exhibited on both sides of Kosovo’s ethnic cleavage.  On the Serb side, 
rather than unconditionally dismantling the parallel structures, illegal by both Security 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
EULEX, using heavily armed personnel, helicopters, and armored vehicles and resulted in rioting in 
Zvečan where the arrest occurred.  See, Fatmir Aliu. “EULEX Raids Home of Zvonko Veselinovic.” 
Balkan Insight (May 22, 2012).   	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Council Resolution 1244 and the 1999 NATO agreement, they and their employees are 
welcomed into the central police and government structures (GLPS 03/2013).  Consistent 
civil unrest has resulted from pursuing criminal cases against parallel leaders.  This has 
heavily influenced EULEX’s ability to function in a purely technical manner.  Following 
the arrest of Slobodan Sovrlić in March 2014 in the Zubin Potok municipality he was 
freed from custody by a mob that laid siege to the municipal police station.  Instead of 
staging a manhunt using EULEX’s Mitrovica-based breaching unit, EU officials 
negotiated the return of Sovrlić with the mayor of Zubin Potok, Stevan Vulović, after two 
weeks (Interview with EU Official).55  The role of EULEX can be described as 
facilitating dialogue with the local institutions in the North to achieve RoL-related 
outcomes (Interview with EULEX Executive Official).    
South of the Ibar, the need to preserve political stability in the Kosovar 
leadership, for the sake of the dialogue, has had even more damaging effects on RoL.  Of 
the five security threats identified in the European Security Strategy (ESS), three are 
applicable to the Western Balkan region – regional conflict, state failure, and organized 
crime.  Only one of these, organized crime, falls within the RoL competency of EULEX.  
Consequently, EULEX’s ability to pursue its mandate in combatting organized crime is 
constricted for the sake of stability and the reduction of the potential other two security 
threats.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Slobodan Sovrlić was arrested in March 2014 in Zubin Potok for public unrest, and afterwards it was 
realized that he was on the EULEX wanted list for endangering UN, EULEX, and related personnel, among 
other criminal activities.  After his arrest a mob formed outside the Zubin Potok KP station and a group of 
masked men entered.  Material damages occurred to the station and Sovrlić was released by KP officers for 
fear of further violence.   
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Factors affecting the dialogue have taken clear primacy over the RoL-based issues 
(Interview with Venera Hajrullahu, Prishtina 2014; and, interview with Idrizi)56, 
including basic functionality and the operational capacity of EULEX (Interview with 
EULEX Strengthening Official, Prishtina 2014).57  Leadership unpredictability in Kosovo 
casts a degree of uncertainty over the stability of the region, with the potential to induce 
regional conflict and state failure, especially in the fragile relationship between Kosovo 
and Serbia.  EULEX has received pressure from Brussels not to disturb the dialogue or 
those involved (Interview with Agron Bajrami, Prishtina 2014).58  Corruption and 
organized crime cases against Kosovo’s political elites, especially given their status in the 
public eye, would risk widespread instability, while also eliminating the EU’s negotiating 
partners (Interview with Sejdiu).  Consequently certain elites, critical to the dialogue, 
have received virtual impunity from the international community for the sake of stability 
(Interview w/ Florina Duli; interview with Korenica; and, interview with UN official).  
When Sami Lushtaku was arrested on war crimes charges, it was reported that a Brussels 
official ordered EULEX to release him, in order for him to take office as mayor of 
Skenderaj (GLPS 05/2014, 2014).59  In other cases, EULEX has rotated prosecutors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Venera Hajrullahu is currently the director of the Kosovar Civil Society Foundation, based in Prishtina.  
Prior to this post she was part of the initial European Integration project until the Ministry for European 
Integration was formally established. 
57 This participant has chosen to remain confidential. 
58 Agron Bajrami is currently the editor-in-chief of Koha Ditore, the only daily publication in Kosovo.  He 
began working for the paper prior to the war and was instrumental in restarting its publication while in 
exile in Macedonia. 
59 Sami Lushtaku, mayor of Skenderaj in north-central Kosovo, is accused of being a leader of the ‘Drenica 
Group’ during the war, a KLA cell responsible for running the Likovc detention camp in the Drenica 
valley, where non-Kosovar and Kosovar collaborators were held.  Lushtaku himself is accused of executing 
one man and torturing and overseeing the torture of many.  He along with five others were arrested in May 
2013, sparking outcry by the Prishtina government.  Since his arrest he has repeatedly fled EULEX 
custody, claiming to be receiving treatment at the hospital. 
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home while working high-level corruption cases and local media has been actively 
discouraged from publishing details on such cases (Interview with Bajrami).60   
Success of the dialogue to date presents a conundrum to EULEX.  The conclusion 
of the Brussels Agreement in April 2013 has greatly enhanced RoL in the North, an 
explicit priority in its mission statement, by both extending and strengthening the 
competency of the KP Northern Command and increasing its legitimacy.  However, in 
order to achieve and sustain this, basic functionality of justice and the betterment of 
quality of life for the population (Roberts’, 2008, ‘performance legitimacy’) has been 
sacrificed in order to not rock the political boat (Interview with Deda).  And this has left 
certain sensitive fields untouched.  For example, while the official MUP parallel security 
personnel were integrated into KP, the civil protection units, or quasi-militias responsible 
for unrest were left unaddressed.  Their demobilization hinges on the cooperation of elites 
largely unsupportive of the dialogue process for the jeopardy it presents their current 
status, and potentially less conducive to Belgrade’s control as parallel funding and 
support subsides (BCSP/KCSS, 2011).  It can be determined that EULEX’s practice of 
‘building consensus’ on RoL principles is tantamount to the empowerment of ‘local 
warlord or militia’ figures Stromseth (2007) adamantly cautions against.  As she argues, 
their empowerment in the interest of short-term goals ultimately spoils long-term RoL 
objectives (Stromseth, 2007).   
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 In an interview with Agron Bajrami (Prishtina, 2014), he identified a EULEX prosecutor as being rotated 
home immediately after publicly proposing sentencing options in the Fatmir Limaj corruption case.  In the 
same case, Mr. Bajrami himself was explicitly asked by EU officials to not publish details of the case in his 
newspaper.   
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Section VI – Analysis: Cultural and Societal Influence on Rule of Law Programming 
 
The preceding section of this paper identified the role played by EULEX’s rule of 
law (RoL) programming in the political space in Kosovo.  This section will examine the 
two major obstacles to EULEX’s function and success in the everyday space.61  This 
includes a historically-rooted culture of resistance to central authority, and the systematic 
practices of nepotism and corruption.   
 
Cultural Resistance to Central RoL and EULEX 
Resistance to the central authority possessing a monopoly on means of violence is 
an enduring phenomenon in Kosovo.  George Kastriot Skanderbeu, the national hero of 
Albanians whose double-headed black eagle adorns the Albanian flag, was a nationalist 
who first fought against occupation by the Serbs only to turn around and fight his 
Ottoman patrons.  The accounts of journalists such Edith Durham, Rebecca West, Tim 
Judah, and Robert Kaplan all relay the tales of the culturally revered bandits of the 
Drenica Valley who terrorized the Ottoman and Serb occupiers for generations prior to 
Kosovo’s inclusion in Yugoslavia.  Frederick Anscombe (2006) describes Albanian 
banditry in the Ottoman Empire as having reached ‘crisis proportions by the turn of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Oliver Richmond’s notion of post-liberal peace theory (Section II) acknowledges the inherent 
politicization of liberal peace theory and seeks to combine its positives, such as the contributions of donor-
driven programming with the ‘everyday space’.  Richmond defines the ‘everyday space’ as that in which 
local communities live and develop political strategies in their own environment, often identified as 
including features of solidarity, local-agency, hybridity, and de-politicization (Richmond, 2010).  
Richmond (2010), Visoka (2012), and Richmond and Mitchell (2011) all identify Albin Kurti’s self-
determination Lëvizja Vetëvendosje! movement as a site of ‘everyday’ politics in Kosovo. Founded in 2004 
by Albin Kurti, Lëvizja Vetëvendosje largely opposes international stewardship in Kosovo and the current 
dialogue process with Belgrade, and advocates unilateral action.  Early on it was an advocate of unification 
with Albania.  Its tactics have included mass demonstration, defacement of international property, and 
graffiti.  It is strongly opposed by the US Embassy in Prishtina.   
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19th Century.  He argues that banditry was primarily economically motivated, but 
“provided the backbone of something akin to a local legal defiance bloc” (Anscombe, 
“Albanians and Mountain Bandits”, 2006: 90).62  By the early 18th century, the Drenica 
Valley in central Kosovo had become characterized by lawlessness and the refusal to pay 
taxes (Ancsombe, “The Ottoman Empire”, 2006).  As the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY/J) began to crumble following the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980 
and with it Kosovo’s autonomy (see Section IV – Context), resistance to authority again 
became prominent in Kosovar society.  Contemporary Kosovo lore is rich with figures 
who resisted the Serbs in the 1990s, including Rugova, the Jashari brothers (especially 
Adem), and scores of others whose likenesses are iconized in the form of statues and 
murals in Kosovo’s cities or along the major roadways.   
The artistic commemoration of those who resisted Serb authority is only a minor 
indicator of the cultural resistance to Serb authority during the repressive period of the 
1990s. The result of this period has been a continued aversion to a law-affect society, in 
accordance with Richard Sannerholm’s (2007) argument, presented in Section II.  
Sannerholm argues that in cases of post-authoritarian liberal peace building projects, 
prevailing distrust of the justice system, due to its use for repression, constitutes a barrier 
to RoL prior to any deployment of RoL programming.  Until 1999 in Kosovo, breaking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 In his work, Frederick Anscombe rejected Eric Hobsbawm’s social banditry argument of extra-
institutional movements or parties coupling with bandit groups to achieve political goals against an 
oppressor.  Rather, he argues that Albanian banditry was self-motivated by economic gains and 
consolidation of power, and lacked a genuine political or ethnic dimension.  Often times the Ottoman 
troops and administrators combatting the widespread banditry were also Albanian and mutual defection, 
both ways, between the army and bandit gangs was common.  Hobsbawm’s social banditry thesis applies 
more directly to the actions of KLA whose armed resistance to the Serbian regime was tied to an extra-
institutional political movement, and has come to be associated with the Jashari brothers, known brigands 
prior to the formation of the KLA.  See, Frederick F. Anscombe. “Albanians and Mountain Bandits.” The 
Ottoman Balkans ed. Frederick F. Anscombe (London: Birkbeck e-Prints, 2006): 87-113; Pat O’Malley. 
“Social Bandits, Modern Capitalism and the Traditional Peasantry. A Critique of Hobsbawm.” Journal of 
Peasant Studies 6.4 (1979): 489-501; and, Eric J. Hobsbawm. “Social Banditry.” Rural Protest: Peasant 
Movements and Social Change ed. H.W. Landsberger(London: MacMillan, 1974): 142-57. 
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the law constituted a patriotic act, as they were the laws of the oppressor.  And refusal to 
pay taxes was equivalent to refusing to fund one’s enemy.  Thus society was conditioned 
by a lack of ownership of the laws in place (Interview with Sejdiu).  Society was further 
conditioned to a lack of trust in rule of law institutions during this period as they were 
used as repressive instruments of the Serbian regime (Interview with Deda).   
As a result of this period, stigmas continue to exist in both the justice organs of 
the government and the legislation it passes.  Thus local ownership and societal 
consensus on RoL standards is lacking in contemporary Kosovo.  EULEX and UNMIK 
before it, which have overseen the reform of the ‘justice triad’ are not local institutions.  
Likewise, Kosovo’s laws are drawn from an international framework, mandated to it by 
the international community (Interview with Muja).  UNMIK itself developed the legal 
code during its administration, while currently the EU through its IPA (instrument for 
pre-accession assistance) programs sends experts to assist local counterparts in the 
drafting of legislation.63    As part of these 'twinning’ projects, EULEX provides experts 
in fields relating to those covered in its mandate (Interview with Edis Agani, Prishtina 
2014).64   Since 1999, the justice triad (judicial system, police, and legislation) has been 
rebuilt in accordance with internationally promoted standards, but without local 
consensus on RoL in what could be considered the Richmond’s everyday space.  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Instruments for Pre-accession Assistance (IPAs) are funding programs by the EU aimed at specific 
reforms within a target state.  They are carried out as twinning projects in which local government selects a 
partner member state, and then works in working groups with experts from these states.  There are currently 
300 IPA projects deployed in Kosovo, including RoL projects focused on anti-corruption, anti-laundering, 
anti-trafficking, migration, data protection and civil registry, forensic medicine, judiciary, and juvenile 
justice facility.  These focus boosting training capacities, such as the Kosovo Judicial Institute and assisting 
in drafting legislation specific to law enforcement or justice matters.  See also, European Union Assistance 
to Kosovo as Related to the Rule of Law. European Court of Auditors Special Report No. 18//2012 (2012).   
64 Edis Agani is an employee of the EU Civilian Office in Prishtina. The office is divided into two sections 
– political and cooperation.  Ms. Agani is a task manager in the cooperation section, working on the rule of 
law team and handling projects related to organized crime. 
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product of this has been a continued rejection of the central justice triad and lack of 
patience for its proceedings (Interview with UN Official; and, interview with EU 
Official).   
Societal rejection and lack of ownership of the post-1999 central RoL system has 
significantly impeded RoL programming and reform on the behalf of EULEX.  This has 
been manifested in both the practice of traditional justice and the systematic interference 
with justice proceedings in the central RoL system.  Especially in rural Kosovo, 
community and family ties play a central role in ‘everyday’ relationships and interactions 
(Interview with Korenica).  Certain issues, such as domestic violence, have traditionally 
been regarded as in-family issues, and thus are not brought before the justice system 
(Interview with Sadiku).  The Kanun, a set of traditional social laws and guidelines dating 
from the Ottoman Period, and containing provisions for hospitality, kinship, right 
conduct, and honor, has been paradoxically cited in decisions.  ‘Honor killing’ is 
permitted by the kanun, in the event a family is insulted, and revenge killings are 
obligatory for the oldest male family member, in the event a family member is murdered.  
Failure to carry out ‘honor’ or revenge killings results in disgrace for the family 
(Mangalakova, 2004).  This traditional set of practices is not in conformance with 
contemporary RoL standards and can not be cited as a basis for legal decisions in a law-
affect society (Interview with Sheremeti; and, interview with EU Official).65  Extra-legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 The Kanun of Lek Dukagini originated in the 15th century in the northern Geg Albanian regions, which 
include Kosovo.  Over the centuries, the kanun was added to and divided into 12 sections: ‘the church’, 
‘family’, ‘marriage’, ‘the house, cattle, and family’, ‘work’, ‘loans’, ‘pledge’, ‘honor’, ‘damages’, ‘the 
kanun against harm’, ‘the kanun of judgment,’ and ‘exemptions and exceptions’.  During the communist 
periods in Yugoslavia and Albania the kanun disappeared, but reemerged, especially in the Albanian 
regions of Yugoslavia, following its collapse.  See, Tanya Mangalova. “The Kanun in Present Day Albania, 
Kosovo, and Montenegro.” International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations (IMIR) 
(2004).   
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means of justice, such as revenge killings and attacks on property, permitted by the kanun 
have been practiced, primarily in the more traditional, rural settings (Interview with 
Vorgučić).   Urban dwellers have proven to be more prone to using centralized justice 
means of dispute resolution (Interview with Sejdiu).   
Within the central justice system, the traditional conceptions of community, clan, 
and family relations also play an interfering role.  The nature of Kosovo’s society, both in 
its size and community relationships, coupled with the lack of adequate security 
capabilities, has resulted in widespread subjectivity and intimidation in legal proceedings 
(Interview with Sheremeti; and, GLPS 05/2014, 2014).  Witness protection has proven 
nearly impossible.  It is a commonly held suspicion that the families of former KLA 
fighters continue to be in possession of firearms, despite KFOR disarming after the war.  
Even in cases in which sufficient evidence has been gathered, they have been dismissed 
due to witnesses disappearing or changing their statements, or judges ordering the case 
not be pursued (KCSS, 2011).  Initial insufficient protection for judges and witnesses led 
to a period in which intimidation flourished unpunished, and left a legacy of perceived 
intimidation, especially in handling cases involving former KLA fighters or their 
families.  Judges and prosecutors don’t pursue certain cases even for fear of potential 
threats (Interview with Sejdiu). Fearing both physical threats or losses of their jobs, local 
judges and prosecutors have proven reluctant to take on cases dealing with high-level 
corruption, organized crime, human rights violations, or former KLA fighters.  Rather 
these have been left to EULEX to handle (KIPRED 1/2014, 2014).   
EULEX judges and prosecutors have the advantage over their local counterparts 
in this respect, as they are not nearly as open to intimidation or the pressures of 
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family/clan ties.  Additionally, they have no background in the kanun or other traditional 
legal codes in conflict with modern RoL.  Witnesses in EULEX cases, though, have 
proven to be just as susceptible to intimidation or prior loyalties.  This was exposed with 
considerable embarrassment to EULEX during the 2011 trial of Fatmir Limaj, when 
‘Witness X’, former KLA commander Agim Zogaj in EULEX’s protection was found 
dead in Duisburg, Germany.  His death was officially ruled a suicide, but destroyed trust 
in EULEX’s capability.66  EULEX exclusively handling sensitive cases, though, is not 
desirable.  Logistically, EULEX’s judicial component (judges and prosecutors: Section I 
– Introduction) is drastically understaffed, composing only 13% of deployed personnel, 
despite the evident need of more.  A continued backlog of cases in the EULEX system 
only leads to increased incentives for individual justice (Interview with Sheremeti).  This 
practice however does nothing to address the existing difficulty in local investment in 
law-affect society, or ownership of law and RoL organs. 
The middle ground is the employment of mixed panels of judges, on which both 
EULEX judges and their local counterparts serve.  This operational method has been 
employed successfully in Kosovo, but not in the most sensitive of organized crime, war 
crimes, or corruption cases (Author’s court observations).67  Early attempts at the use of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 The majority of charges against Limaj’s involvement in war crimes at the Klecka detention came from 
testimony by Zogaj, who was responsible for KLA security in that region during the 1999-98 war.  Zogaj 
surrendered to EULEX after an attack by unknown gunmen on his home in Prizren and was sent to live 
with his brother in Duisburg.  He was found hanged from a tree in a park in September 2011.  His family 
criticized EULEX for lack of physical security, and claimed that he wouldn’t have committed suicide 
unless forced to.  His brother described Agim as being under immense emotional stress prior to the trial.  
See, Matthew Brunwasser. “Death of War Crimes Witness Casts Cloud on Kosovo.” NY Times, Oct. 6, 
2011; and, “Witness in ex-KLA Trial Fears for Safety, Won’t Testify.” Radio B92, Sept. 29, 2011. 
67 In Kosovo, in summer 2014, I observed two EULEX trial proceedings that occurred in the city of 
Prishtina.  The first, which occurred at the ABC Cinema in Prishtina, was a human trafficking case, 
involving two defendants present and one not, who had been responsible for smuggling persons illegally 
into the EU using a bus service.  This trial was presided over by a single judge from the EULEX mobile 
division, originally from Poland, and was prosecuted by a EULEX prosecutor from the SPRK, originally 
from the UK.  The second trial observed was a case of abuse of official position, by the manager of a Credit 
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mixed panels in war crimes and organized crime cases by UNMIK largely failed.  
Kosovar judges, the majority on panels, often outvoted their UNMIK counterparts 
resulting in dubious rulings in cases involving ethnic minorities (GLPS 05/2014, 2014).   
This early practice dissuaded Serbs from participation in the Kosovo justice system and 
encouraged reliance on parallel and informal structures, as well as individual justice, such 
as the construction of barricades in Mitrovica (Interview with EULEX Executive 
Official).   
 
Systematic Nepotism and Corruption 
A newer phenomenon than the cultural opposition to central authority in the rural 
areas of Kosovo, is the systematic practice of nepotism and corruption within Kosovo’s 
public and administrative frameworks.  Contemporary Kosovar society is characterized 
by a system of semi-tribal neo-patrimonial practices, in which loyalty to family, clan, and 
community ties trumps loyalty to the state.  Loyalty within the social group is rewarded 
in the form of jobs, protection, or concessions for contracts (Interview with Muja).   
Given Kosovo’s recent history, the political structures and legislative framework 
are very new institutions.  This holds true for the political class.  Virtually all Kosovar 
politicians were expelled from government under the Milošević regime.  Parallel political 
structures failed to be consolidated under a single leader, and as the 1990s progressed 
into violence in Kosovo, the KLA became an increasingly potent political force.  After all 
it was KLA political leader Hashim Thaçi who headed the Kosovar delegation at the 
Rambouillet peace talks, not the LDK’s Ibrahim Rugova.  As was illustrated in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Mutual Bank branch in Gjakova/Đakovica.  This trial occurred at the basic court in Prishtina and was 
provided over by a mixed panel of two Kosovar and one EULEX judge, and prosecuted by a EULEX 
prosecutor.   
	   68	  
context section (Section IV), the political elite that emerged during the UNMIK period 
following the war came almost exclusively from the KLA and were backed by the US 
and European states.  It is important to note that the original KLA and its leadership was 
drawn heavily from the rural areas of Kosovo, such as Drenica, where the shooting war 
began in 1998, and the Dukagjini region, which experienced some of the heaviest 
fighting and ethnic cleansing during 1998-99.  The KLA leaders who emerged from these 
areas retain a strong base of support there, founded in community allegiance.   
 
 
Image 2: map of geographic 
party affiliations in Kosovo, 
November 2013 elections.  
Credit, Nicollette Staton, 
Miami University 
Geography Department. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is illustrated in figure 6.1, which depicts general party affiliation by region in 
the November 2013 elections.  Party ideology and political platforms are worn loosely, 
while group and regional interests prevail. The overall trend is for a specific area to vote 
primarily for the party of the KLA commander from that area.  For example the Alliance 
for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) draws the bulk of its support from the southwest, 
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Dukagjini region.  This was where AAK leader Ramush Haradinaj commanded during 
the war.  Likewise, the bulk of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) support is drawn 
from the central Drenica region, the region from which Hashim Thaçi and Sami Lushtaku 
hail (Interview with Muja).  The party of Ibrahim Rugova, the LDK, which was not 
associated with the KLA and remained primarily non-violent, has maintained a base of 
support around Prishtina and Rugova’s hometown of Peja (western Kosovo, near the 
Montenegrin border).   
What this means is that party allegiance and clan or community allegiance largely 
correspond.  Thus loyalty to the political party, for the most part, trumps loyalty to the 
state of Kosovo.  The bureaucracy has been politically linked since its post-war inception 
and those employed in it receive their posts or future promotions through cronyism as 
their party succeeds (Interview with Rreze Duli).  Party loyalty is more ensured as the 
economic and unemployment situations in Kosovo remain dire.  Reward for loyalty from 
the party leaders is a more likely means of employment in the public administration than 
merit (Interview with Mazrreku).68  And this holds true for the justice sector.  The 
political elites are very adept at retaining structural influence within the justice system by 
appointing loyal supporters to key functions, which has been the case across all major 
parties, not just the ruling ones (Interview with Sejdiu).   
Naturally this connected system of allegiance and patrimony influences the 
functioning of law-affect society, based upon successful RoL standards and institutions.  
The system of patrimony constitutes an open pathway for political interference with the 
functioning of RoL.  Political pressure can be high in certain cases and judges, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 The EU EEM 2011 report cites an interview with Arbin Ahmeti of Koha Ditore newspaper in which he 
states political parties are run like ‘private businesses’, in which supports are rewarded with municipal or 
state administration jobs, licenses, or procurement contracts (EU EEM, 2011).    
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prosecutors, or witnesses run the risk of losing their elite party patronage in the 
government or offending long-standing family, clan, community, or KLA allegiances.  In 
such cases against influential individuals, prosecutors have failed to submit indictments, 
judges have postponed hearings for extended periods, and authorities and lawyers have 
feigned ill for extended periods.  A lack of disciplinary or internal control measures in the 
justice system permits this (GLPS 05/2014, 2014; and KIPRED 2010/08, 2010).  EULEX 
officials have reported high rates of political pressure against Kosovar authorities in 
major cases, with offers of reward made for interference with a case (KIPRED 1/14, 
2014).  Consequently few high profile corruption cases end in convictions.  In cases that 
do get prosecuted, usually at the hands of EULEX, lower level bureaucrats take the fall 
for the elite patrimonial figures, often with promise of future reward (Interview with 
EULEX Strengthening Official). 
In addition to being used to obstruct investigations and proceedings, patronage 
networks in the justice system can be used for revenge against political opponents.  
Though not as overt as the honor and revenge killings permitted by the kanun, this 
provides an institutional means for a clan or community, in this case represented by a 
political party, to attack opposition.  For example, Lëvizja Vetëvendosje! has pledged to 
use the justice system to punish opponents when (if) it comes to power in the central 
government (Interview with Muja).  Similarly, after finally coming to power after a long 
political stalemate, LDK Prime Minister Isa Mustafa in January 2015 has begun lobbying 
the EU-run special war crimes court for Kosovo to pursue the murder cases of his 
political allies.  He asserts that agents of ShIK, the extra-institutional intelligence branch 
of the long-ruling PDK, were responsible for the murders of LDK party members 
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between 1999-2003.69  This constitutes an overt exhibition of attempted political 
influence over RoL that a party would not have if not in power. 
The one major success to come from the fight against systematic corruption, was 
ironically the successful prosecution of the head of SPRK Special Anti-Corruption Task 
Force.  In April 2012, Nazmi Mustafi was arrested by EULEX police and indicted by the 
SPRK for soliciting bribes from suspects under investigation for corruption.  He and three 
of his subordinates were convicted by the SPRK (KIPRED 1/14, 2014).  However this 
constitutes the only successful case concluded in a conviction against a high-level 
official, despite a widespread belief of corruption in virtually all sectors of administration 
(Interview with EULEX Strengthening Official; and, interview with Agron Bajrami).  
What this case illustrates is that, when permitted to pursue high-level investigations, 
EULEX provides able means to combatting the embedded networks of patronage and 
corruption, by operating outside of a justice system which they compromise (KIPRED 
1/14, 2014).  However, as presented in the preceding section (Section V – Politicization 
of RoL), EULEX’s work in his field has been largely limited and unsatisfactory for 
political reasons (Interview with Mazrreku; and interview with Deda).  The effect the 
current corruption allegations within EULEX, brought forward by Maria Bamieh, will 
have upon its ability to act in high-level anti-corruption cases is uncertain, but is likely to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Among the ‘dozen’ LDK figures Mustafa is lobbying for justice for are Enver Moloku and Tahir Zemaj.  
Moloku was a journalist and LDK activist during the 1990s and was shot outside his home in 1999 by an 
unknown gunman.  Zemaj was head of the LDK’s armed wing, which was at odds with the KLA.  He was 
killed along with his son and nephew in an ambush in 2003.  ShIK, or the Kosovo Information Service, was 
an informal intelligence and security organization that evolved out of the KLA and operated under the 
control of the PDK.  In December 2009, EULEX arrested Nazim Bllaca, who turned himself in, claiming to 
be an assassin in the employ of ShIK.  Bllaca claimed that ShIK specifically targeted LDK members for 
assassination.  Officially ShIK was disbanded in 2008 and its leadership denies all knowledge of Bllaca.  
See, Petrit Collaku. “New Kosovo Court ‘Must Probe Political Murders’.” Balkan Insight: Balkan 
Transitional Justice, Jan. 12, 2015; and, Fisnik Minci. "Bllaca Case, Test for EULEX's Credibility." Koha 
Ditore, Dec. 10, 2009. 
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contribute to and justify already exceedingly negative public opinion regarding EULEX 
and its efforts to take down ‘big fish’ (see Section VII – EULEX as a Model).70  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 In October 2014, EULEX prosecutor Maria Bamieh accused EULEX judge Francesco Florit of accepting 
a bribe of €300,000 to release a Kosovar defendant in a murder case.  Her accusation includes that Florit 
met with a lawyer in Durrës, Albania to discuss the release of three murder suspects: Besnik Hasani, 
Shpend Qerimi, and Nusret Cena.  Besnik Hasani’s brother admits to paying Florit €300,000 for the release 
of Cena, but not the other two as the money was deemed insufficient.  Bamieh asserts that her reports on 
his case were not pursued or disappeared and she was threatened with arrest before finally being dismissed 
from duty.  See, “EU Kosovo Mission Accused of Tolerating Corruption.” Balkan Insight: Balkan 
Transitional Justice, Oct. 29, 2014; and, “BIRN Interviews Prosecutor and Judge in EULEX Scandal.” 
Balkan Insight: Balkan Transitional Justice, Oct. 30, 2014. 	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Section VII – Analysis: EULEX as a Model of Rule of Law Intervention 
 
The preceding two sections of analytical narrative have discussed EULEX’s 
operations in the political space in Kosovo and its effects, as well as EULEX’s inability 
to engender a sense of local ownership of law-affect society in the ‘everyday’ space.  
This section seeks to examine EULEX as a model for RoL intervention and programming 
in post-conflict societies.  In so doing, public opinion concerning EULEX, its on-the-
ground practices, and its sustainable legacy will be examined.  All of these aspects of its 
deployment and operation serve as an example not only to the relevant local authorities it 
is tasked with mentoring and advising, but also future RoL-based missions in post-
conflict societies.   
 
Public Opinion   
During the course of interviews all those interviewed were asked to comment on 
the public opinion or attitudes towards EULEX in Kosovo.  Specifically, those 
interviewed from civil society were asked the following questions: “What is the public’s 
view towards EULEX in the Kosovo-Serb municipalities?”; and, “Is this view different 
than the public view towards EULEX in the rest of Kosovo.  If so, in what way.”  Those 
interviewed as officials of EULEX, the EU, and the UN were asked: “How do the publics 
in these [Serb] municipalities receive EULEX and European rule of law?”  Not all public 
opinion information was gathered strictly from these questions, but responses to these 
and other questions conveyed an overall negative view of the mission by the population.  
EULEX’s deployment in Kosovo was initially surrounded by enthusiasm and high public 
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opinion in the Kosovar population.  The hope was for rapid and dramatic improvements 
in the fields of justice that had been lacking under UNMIK.  This was fed by overly 
ambitious pronouncements by EULEX officials, lofty goals in its mandate, and the 
promise to pursue cases against the criminal ‘big fish’ (Interview with Deda; KIPRED 
1/13, 2013).  High rates of arrests and convictions were expected in a society largely 
unsatisfied with the status of RoL (Interview with Sadiku).  There was also an 
expectation of the stabilization of both inter-ethnic relations and the economy as a 
byproduct of successful RoL implementation (Interview with Muja).   
The first blow to EULEX’s public image was suffered immediately, in its 
acceptance of a status-neutral mandate.  This act, though necessary in order to be legally 
deployed, greatly damaged local legitimacy, as it rejected the Ahtisaari Plan, upon which 
Kosovo’s sovereignty was based, and had the appearance of conceding to Kosovars’ 
recent oppressor, Serbia (GLPS 05/2014, 2014).  A perception grew from this that 
EULEX was acting as a defender of the Serb communities (Interview with Muja).  Thus 
for Kosovar nationalists, EULEX came to represent a burden (Interview with Vorgučić).   
For Serbs south of the Ibar River, EULEX, like KFOR served as a further 
guarantee against a resurgence of ethnic violence like that experienced in 2004 (Interview 
with Vorgučić).  However for those Serbs in the North, and those south of the Ibar River 
clinging to nationalist hopes, EULEX’s deployment was emblematic of Kosovo’s 
sovereignty.   Despite its claims of status-neutrality, its basis within Kosovo’s legal 
framework and work in concert with the KP and SPRK constitutes, for those Serbs, de 
facto cooperation with Kosovar institutions and a breach of status-neutrality (Interview 
with Deda; interview with Idrizi; interview with Korenica; interview with Florina Duli; 
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and interview with Sadiku).  Likewise its manner of executive policing, using militarized 
tactics, in the North has further been a detriment to public support.  There it is viewed 
primarily as political thugs functioning on the Kosovar government’s behalf, engaging in 
a ‘Serb-hunt’ (Interview with EU Official; interview with UN Official; and, GLPS 
01/2013, 2013).  A more detailed account of the influences on public opinion in the North 
and the effects it has on local elites and EULEX’s operational capabilities there is found 
in the section on politicizing RoL (Section V – Analysis: EULEX and the Politicization 
of Rule of Law).   
Following the initial blow suffered by the adoption of status-neutrality, public 
support for EULEX on the Kosovar side of the ethnic cleavage has wavered with the 
execution of concrete actions in accordance with its mandate and those early 
pronouncements made by its officials (Interview with Idrizi).  When big cases, such as 
the Nazmi Mustafi case, are concluded with a conviction, public support for EULEX’s 
actions increases.  On the other hand, when high-profile cases are either not pursued or 
not concluded with a conviction, public support drops (Interview with Hajrullahu).  When 
people see those figures they consider to be the criminal ‘big fishes’ running for or 
occupying public office, blame is attributed to EULEX and support for it declines 
(Interview with Sadiku).  This, however, like public opinion among Serbs, is dependent 
upon one’s nationalist or patriotic disposition.  People with a background in the war 
become highly agitated with EULEX’s pursuit of cases against former war heroes (see 
Section V).  Conversely, people without the war background, view war crimes cases and 
those pursued against former KLA fighters as EULEX’s success (Interview with 
Korenica).   
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Data from polls conducted both by local universities and UNDP demonstrate a 
decline in public support for EULEX (Interview with Deda; and, interview with 
Mazrreku).  The UNDP Public Pulse Survey IV, conducted in August 2013 supports 
assertions of overly negative public opinion.  Kosovar satisfaction with EULEX was 
recorded at 19%, having continuously decreased since 2008.  And perceptions of 
corruption in EULEX had increased from 22.9% in 2010, to 38.3% in 2013.  These 
statistics are remarkably poor compared to KP, which recorded a 75% satisfaction rating, 
and 30.3% perception of corruption rating.  Kosovo Serbs also recorded a higher 
satisfaction rating of KP at 29%, compared to 11% for EULEX (UNDP “Public Pulse 
IV”, 2013).   
Ultimately this negative public opinion has stemmed from a failure by EULEX to 
deliver on its own pronouncements, and inability to live up to the high expectations 
surrounding its deployment.  Because of this, it is viewed as the same ineffective 
institution as UNMIK.  Graffiti around Prishtina equates the two missions and EULEX’s 
practice of hiring of out-of-work UNMIK personnel in 2008 undoubtedly fueled this 
negative perception (Interview with Idrizi).71   Its operation is seen as politically 
constrained and selective, displaying reluctance to pursue cases involving influential 
political or financial actors (Interview with Hajrullahu; and, interview with Bajrami).  
The broader authority that was hoped would be established has not yet been seen 
(Interview with Mazrreku).  Furthermore, the judicial sector, which posed the greatest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 In 2008 UNMIK all but left Kosovo, leaving only its name for EULEX to legally operate under in 
conformance with the ‘Six-Point Plan’ and UNSCR 1244.  Large numbers of UNMIK police and judicial 
personnel were transferred to EULEX due to familiarity with the situation on the ground.  UNMIK 
buildings and vehicles were also transferred and the signage on them changed.  Those personnel transferred 
had a poor reputation in Kosovo, as westerners taking advantage of the situation because of the low cost of 
living and high wages paid.    
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challenge to RoL in Kosovo, remains dysfunctional in the public view.  UNDP identified 
it as the least approved of branch of government, with a rating of only 16.7%.  Indicators 
such as this contribute to the perceived failure of EULEX, and raise questions in the 
public as to the justification for such an investment by the EU (Interview with Korenica; 
and, interview with Idrizi).   
 
EULEX Operational Practices and a Precedent of Duality 
This paper has already established an ethno-territorial disparity evident in 
EULEX’s operational programming.  Different compositions of the ‘everyday’ space 
between the dominant Serb and Kosovar populations, made evident in Sections IV 
(Context), V (Analysis: EULEX and the Politicization of RoL), and VI (Analysis: 
Cultural and Societal Influences on RoL Programming) drastically differ both in terms of 
acceptance and rejection of an RoL system as well as predispositions towards justice, 
criminality, and RoL standards.  Established in the context section (Section IV), the 
North constitutes a de facto partitioned entity within Kosovo, which EULEX has openly 
acknowledged with regards to RoL programming in its mandate.  The dramatically 
different ‘everyday’ and political landscape in the North, as well as its stronger links with 
the Serbian government, has made necessary an operational model different from that 
south of the Ibar River. This includes a stronger executive mandate and the practice of 
more militarized police tactics in conducting arrests.  Given the general aversion to 
EULEX and the inability of intelligence-based policing to function, these tactics are 
necessary (Interview with EU Official).  Aside from the militarized tactics and political 
concerns already identified, EULEX has established a dangerous precedent of duality of 
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RoL standards between the North and the rest of Kosovo, which further concedes de 
facto partition, and further empowers those illiberal elites identified in Section V 
(Interview with Deda).   
Northern Serbs’ early aversion to EULEX, and their political backing in Belgrade, 
made the North a no-go zone, while EULEX was able to deploy and operate broadly in 
the south.  South of the Ibar River, EULEX could both prosecute lower-level Kosovar 
criminality and reform RoL institutions with greater ease.  Consequently, it was deprived 
of the ability to treat all citizens uniformly (Interview with Bajrami).  The perceptions 
among civil society experts of general EULEX operations in the North were as half-
hearted measures.  Police patrols stuck to the main streets, on fixed grids, for security 
concerns, and intra-ethnic crime cases, including homicides were not pursued (Interview 
with Idrizi).  While south of the Ibar, EULEX judges served, and continue to serve, on 
mixed panels of judges with Kosovar colleagues; this is yet to be practiced in the North.  
Even under the new EULEX mandate – which is aimed at increasing local ownership by 
reducing the EULEX executive capacity – EULEX judges will continue to serve on 
strictly EULEX panels at the court in Mitrovica (Interview with EULEX Executive 
Official).  Furthermore, in sensitive cases involving Northern Serbs, EULEX has 
displayed irrational procedures, which both dissuade local support and acknowledge de 
facto partition of a justice system. This was most notably illustrated in the case of Oliver 
Ivanović: he was arrested in Mitrovica, but transported to be charged and detained in 
Prishtina, where his family and legal counsel were unable to visit him, and he voiced 
serious safety concerns about being surrounded by all Kosovar detainees.  After a lengthy 
	   79	  
appeal, he was transferred to the prison in North Mitrovica, and his trial is underway at 
the court there (Interview with EU Official).   
The apparent lack of sense involved in the handling of Ivanović’s, and others’, 
cases raises a number of issues about the model of the justice system that EULEX is 
implementing, which is to serve as a sustainable model for local authorities.  For instance 
allocation for judges within the EULEX system is a highly subjective process, by which a 
judge is selected through consultation between the president of the EULEX council of 
judges and the chief judge of an operational region in which the case is being tried (BIRN 
Interview with Mariah Bamieh, 2014).  Kosovo’s court system in practice employs a 
likewise subjective manner of case allocation.  There is no uniform or transparent 
process, but rather the system differs by court.  In some, cases are allocated by intake 
staff; in some by specialty of the judge; and in others, it is a strictly subjective decision 
by the president of the court.  Case reassignment is likewise as subjective and sometimes 
done unofficially, without the knowledge or approval of the court president (American 
Bar Association, 2010).72  In a justice system identified as compromised with neo-
patrimonial networks (Section VI), this model leaves ample space for manipulation 
(European Court of Auditors, 2012).   
The character of EULEX as a mentoring, monitoring, and advising (MMA) 
mission is that it provides a framework for the relevant local authorities to conform to.  
However the model EULEX has and continues to profess in Kosovo is characterized by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 In a 2010 report, the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative report that despite legal provision 
for an objective system of lottery case assignment, this is not practiced.  This report was produced using 
qualitative data obtained through interviews with judges in the Kosovo system.  Instances of judges 
reassigning cases among themselves without permission or even filing a report were reported.  Judges are 
held responsible for recusing themselves in cases where interests conflict.  See, “Judicial Reform Index for 
Kosovo.” ABA: Rule of Law Initiative Vol. IV (Oct. 2010).   
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judicial impropriety and inconsistency with both prior rulings and accepted European 
legal standards.  By nature of the operation and its structure, questions have to be raised 
about the responsibility of judges and prosecutors and their accountability (KIPRED 
1/13, 2013).  Both EULEX judges and prosecutors, who serve within Kosovo’s 
institutional framework, report to the same EULEX head of mission (HoM).  And none of 
the four HoMs to date have been RoL specialists.  The first two HoMs to serve, Yves de 
Kermabon and Xavier Bout de Marnhac, were former French Generals and commandants 
of KFOR.  The next two, Berndt Borchardt and Gabriele Meucci, were both career 
diplomats prior to their postings as HoM (Interview with Sejdiu; interview with Florina 
Duli; and, KIPRED 1/13, 2013).73   
The dubious relationship between EULEX prosecutor and judge has manifested 
itself in cases of detention on remand – the practice of holding a suspect in custody for 
risk of flight, committing further criminal acts, or attempting to influence aspects of the 
case against him.  Detention on remand itself is not a dubious practice and is permitted 
under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which states: 
The lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of 
bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion 
of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered 
necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having 
done so.74 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 EULEX has come under criticism for the symbolic nature of the HoMs.  In defending itself from 
criticism, the argument was made that military HoMs were necessary in the beginning for their expertise in 
rapid deployment.  However EULEX has failed to successfully deploy in the North.  Likewise criticism has 
been leveled at the latter two HoMs.  As diplomats they feed the perception that EULEX is a political 
entity.    
74 The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was first signed in 1950, by all members of the 
Council of Europe (CoE).  Currently there are 47 parties to the ECHR, which include all member states of 
the EU.  Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Vatican City are the only states that fulfill the geographic criteria for 
membership in the CoE, but are not members and thus not party to the ECHR.   
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ECHR case law has even permitted prolonged detention on remand, or the refusal of bail, 
for the accused in cases of risk that the accused, if released, will fail to appear for trial; 
take action to prejudice the administration of justice; commit further offenses; or cause 
public disorder.  The OSCE further provides a “three pronged test” for determining the 
propriety of detention on remands arguments:  
• There is grounded suspicion that the person has committed a 
criminal offence; 
• There is a risk that the suspected person: (i) will flee or his or her 
identity cannot be established; (ii) will destroy or forge evidence, 
influence witnesses or injured  parties or accomplices; or (iii) will 
repeat the criminal offence; and  
• The alternative non-custodial measures provided in the code are 
insufficient to ensure the presence of the accused, the successful conduct 
of the proceedings  and prevent re-offending (OSCE, 2009; 4).  
 
The impropriety however has arisen with the application of detention on remand.  
EULEX judges have consistently been quick to order detention on remand, demonstrating 
it to be a preferred option.  In so doing they have placed the onus upon the defense to 
prove that the accused will not attempt to flee, tamper with evidence, or influence 
witnesses in the case, rather than on the prosecution to prove the existence of these risks 
(Interview with Sejdiu).  By the case law of the ECHR – specifically Bykov v. Russia 
(2009) – the burden of proof, and the presumption of innocence, can not be reversed.  It is 
not the burden of the accused to demonstrate existence of reasons warranting his release 
(Guide on Article 5 of the Convention, 2014: 14, 27).   
Prior to EULEX deployment in Kosovo, impropriety with regard to detention on 
remand was already identified as an obstacle to RoL and the protection of basic human 
rights.  The OSCE reported inconstancy with the principle of “presumption of liberty” 
and identified public prosecutors as rarely providing sound reasoning.  Arguments for 
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detention on remand were reported as “vague, theoretical, abstract, and formulaic”.  In 
some cases, defendants were not brought before a judge or provided with legal 
representation before detention on remand was ordered (OSCE, 2009; and, Kosovo 
Judicial Council, 2014).  While EULEX’s impropriety in cases of detention on remand is 
a concrete case of providing a bad example of ‘good practice’, it further reinforces 
existing impropriety embedded in the justice system that is in conflict with both 
Kosovo’s laws and accepted international human rights standards (Interview with Sejdiu; 
and, OSCE, 2009).   
 
Sustainability of EULEX Reforms 
EULEX as a mission is founded upon the concept of building sustainability within 
the relevant local institutions it is responsible for mentoring, monitoring, and advising 
(EULEX Mission Statement).  However, like much of EULEX’s employed rhetoric, 
sustainability is highly subjective. The concept of sustainability is dependent upon local 
ownership of “the internationals’ liberal vision”, a consistent concern in the liberal peace 
theory literature (Franks and Richmond, 2008).  Accordingly the sustainability of 
EULEX’s ‘liberal vision’ of RoL is conditional upon the building of trust for local 
institutions in Kosovo’s society.   
As was presented in Section VI (Analysis: Cultural and Societal Influences on 
RoL Programming), Kosovo is generally lacking a law-affect society.  Serbs, especially 
in the North, remain resistant to the reach of Kosovo’s central institutions, while Kosovar 
society has not taken ownership of its new laws and institutions.  Both sides of the ethnic 
cleavage lack the necessary political will to engender ownership.  Elites’ ties to criminal 
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and patrimonial networks throughout the whole of Kosovo results in the lack of necessary 
political will to embolden RoL organs to pursue demanding or precarious cases against 
organized crime networks, war crimes, and high level corruption (Interview with Agani; 
and, interview with UN Official).   
More detrimental to a sustainable RoL system in Kosovo than a lack of political 
will is the practice of political interference in justice proceedings (Interview with Florina 
Duli).  The prolific networks of neo-patrimony, presented in the preceding section 
(Section VI), contribute to systematic interference, as does the current economic situation 
in Kosovo.  Strong party loyalties, reinforced by the fear of losing one’s job for failing to 
comply with a superior’s order has led to a non-independence of all executive RoL 
structures.  This includes the police, judiciary, and prosecution (Interview with UN 
Official; and, interview with EU Strengthening Official).  RoL proceedings are regularly 
disrupted and interfered with by top-down pressure (Interview with EU Executive 
Official).  In addition to the use of nepotistic networks to influence RoL-related 
personnel, the media, private interest groups, and public political rhetoric has been used 
to pressure RoL proceedings (Interview with Muja).   
The Mustafa (2009), Limaj (2011), and Kiqina (2013) cases all provide examples 
of such pressure.  When the Llapi Group retrial concluded in 2009 with a guilty verdict, 
Prime Minister Thaçi publicly pronounced defendant and former KLA fighter and PDK 
official Rrustem Mustafa innocent.  The case was tried by a EULEX mixed panel of 
judges, which included one Kosovar and two internationals.  Following the Prime 
Minister’s pronouncement, the Kosovar judge recanted his guilty verdict (EU EEM, 
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2011).75  In the 2011 war crimes case against Fatmir Limaj, the Assembly acted to review 
MP immunity and asked the Constitutional Court to rule on it. Meanwhile MPs as well as 
the PM made public statements denouncing the EULEX case against Limaj, and 
proposed a vote to end EULEX’s mandate (See Section V – Analysis: EULEX and the 
Politicization of RoL).  The Kiqina murder case pertained to a murder trial in 2007, but 
was addressed by the Assembly in 2013. The original case was a murder trial, in which 
five men were found guilty and it was concluded that the murders were part of a blood 
feud or revenge killings.  One MP claimed that the five defendants in the case, all of 
whom were KLA veterans and all of whom were found guilty, were subjected to “grave 
procedural and human rights violations” during the investigation and demanded retrial.76  
In all cases, the Assembly or its members, which are not a RoL organs, presumed to act 
in function of one and exert pressure on the justice system (Interview with Sadiku).  
Overt political interference such as these cases further contributes to bottom-up rejection 
of RoL principles and a law-affect society.  In turn the public brands decisions reached 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 The ‘Llapi Group’ consisted of defendants Lafit Gashi, Nazif Mehmeti, and Rrustem Mustafa.  
Originally arrested and tried in 2003 under UNMIK, a retrial was opened at the behest of the Supreme 
Court of Kosovo in 2009 under EULEX, the verdict of which has since been appealed.  In the 2003 trial, 
Mustafa was found guilty of illegal detention, inhumane treatment of civilians, torture, and command 
accountability for others’ carrying out the same acts during the 1998-99 war.  He was sentenced to 17 years 
in prison.  In the 2009 retrial he was again found guilty of inhumane treatment and torture of Kosovo 
Albanian civilians in 1998-99 in pursuit of a joint criminal enterprise, and sentenced to four years in prison.  
See, “Case Report: The Public Prosecutor’s Office vs. Latif Gashi, Rrustem Mustafa, Naim Kadriu, and 
Nazif Mehmeti – the Llapi Case.” OSCE Mission in Kosovo (2003); and, “Verdict in Llapi Group Case.” 
EULEX Press Office, Oct. 2 2009. 
76 In August 2001, Blerim Kiqina along with four other KLA veterans ambushed and killed five members 
of the Hajra family, including two children as they returned home from a wedding, using automatic 
weapons.  UNMIK authorities issued a warrant for Kiqina’s arrest in 2002 and he was arrested in 2004, 
after returning from Sweden to visit his father.  Kiqina also implicated Burim Ramadani, Arsim Ramadani, 
Arben Kiqina, and Jeton Kiqina.  It was posited that the murders were potentially revenge killings as the 
father of the family Hamze Hajra had served in the police during the 1990s.  During the parliamentary 
debate of the case, the US Ambassador in Prishtina stated it: “just confirmed the criticism of those who say 
Kosovo political leaders tend to interfere in rule-of-law procedures and undermine the independence of the 
judiciary.  See; “Jeton Kicina Sentenced with 16 Years in Prison.” Kosova Press, Mar. 9 2007; and, Edona 
Peci. “Kosovo Parliament Rejects Family ‘Revenge’ Murders Probe.” Balkan Insight: Balkan Transitional 
Justice, Mar. 19 2013.   
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through acceptable and transparent processes as fraudulent if they are not favorable 
(Interview with UN Official). 
 
 
Image 3: 
Graffiti in Prishtina:  
“Shame to EULEX for  
the Kiqina Case”.   
Credit: Author’s photograph. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the presence of the prolific and systematic top-down interference exerted on 
Kosovo’s justice system, EULEX, as an international authority embedded within local 
institutions, constitutes an institutional resistance to interfering pressure.  Despite the 
negative public opinion presented earlier in this section and the prevalent criticism for its 
executive operations, EULEX has contributed to preventing interference (KIPRED 1/14, 
2014).  EULEX’s ability to act rapidly and executively has pressured local authorities to 
do likewise in certain cases (Interview with Agani).  It was EU advisors that renounced 
the Assembly’s actions on the Kiqina case.  Additionally, EULEX’s mere presence 
alongside local authorities has deterred interference with RoL.  Though EULEX customs 
officers don’t possess more notable expertise than their local counterparts, their presence 
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at checkpoints and on mobile customs teams is reported to have discouraged corrupt 
behavior by high-ranking officers for fear of prosecution (KIPRED 1/13, 2013).77  
While this represents a commendable function of EULEX’s operation, what it 
indicates is a lack of sustainability within institutions and within the RoL framework of 
Kosovo.  Without active international supervision, local authorities would not be able to 
resist pressure from higher ups.  Lower-level authorities wouldn’t have the ability to 
countermand dubious decisions or orders from superiors (Interview with Muja; and, 
interview with EULEX Strengthening Official).  KP is regarded as the most sustainable 
and successful RoL institution (Interview with Idrizi).  It is well regarded publicly and 
has demonstrated the ability to successfully execute general policing function, though has 
struggled with successfully developing intelligence-based policing (Interview with 
Agani).  However KP as a general police force cannot solely maintain RoL and is reliant 
upon less-sustainable, higher up structures, and the political will of the government 
(Interview with Mazrreku).   
According to the European Security and Defense Policy, (ESDP, 2009) in order 
for a police force, in this case a comparatively commendable one in KP, to properly 
function it requires equally well functioning judicial and penitentiary systems.  In 
addition to KP, local judges and prosecutors have demonstrated their ability to handle 
minor claims of a lower magnitude.  However, local investigative, prosecutorial, and 
judicial capacities have not been sufficiently built to handle cases of war crimes, 
organized crime, and high-level corruption involving the political elites (Interview with 
EULEX Executive Official; and, interview with Korenica).  Likewise, though the prison 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 EULEX operates mobile customs teams in the North, which patrol the Kosovo side of the boundary with 
Serbia.  They conduct random checks on vehicles that have passed the customs gates.  Their operation is 
credited to have both reduced smuggling and corruption at the customs gates.   
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system has made great strides in reform, without international supervision, powerful 
figures won’t be detained or held in prison (Interview with EULEX Strengthening 
Official; and, interview with UN Official).  This has been demonstrated in both the cases 
of Slobodan Sovrlić, who was released from custody in Zubin Potok (see Section V), and 
in the ‘Drenica Group’ case, during which three defendants were allowed to leave 
custody while at a hospital.78   
In addition to the inability of the local RoL framework to resist top-down 
interference in justice without EULEX oversight, the poor model of ‘best practices’ 
EULEX employs further cripples its sustainability.  Identified earlier in this section are 
the irregular standards of ethno-territorial disparity in RoL, case allotment, and detention 
on remand.  Through its functioning, EULEX has established a disparity in RoL 
implementation ethno-territorially.  And, as Section V identified, the majority of progress 
in the Serb ethno-territorial space has been through political agreement.  This is neither a 
consistent nor sustainable process that is dependent upon leadership stability and good 
faith on the parts of the GoK, Serbian government, and Kosovo Serb leaders (especially 
in the North).  The subjective manner of case allotment within EULEX sets a poor 
example for local counterparts and leaves substantial opportunity open for neo-
patrimonial capture of judicial proceedings, without EULEX oversight.  And lastly, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  Slobodan Sovrlić was arrested in March 2014 in Zubin Potok for public unrest, and afterwards it was 
realized that he was on the EULEX wanted list for endangering UN, EULEX, and related personnel, among 
other criminal activities.  After his arrest a mob formed outside the Zubin Potok KP station and a group of 
masked men entered.  Material damages occurred to the station and Sovrlić was released by KP officers for 
fear of further violence.  Prior to the beginning of the trial of the so-called “Drenica Group” in May 2014, 
three defendants, Sami Lushtaku, Ismet Haxha, and Salit Jashari, walked out of custody while supposedly 
receiving medical treatment at a clinic in Prishtina.  An arrest warrant was issued and the police began a 
search after the defendants did not appear for the trial.  The defendants’ attorneys stated that this was a 
communication error and the police had not transported them to the court in Mitrovica for safety reasons.  
The disappearance from custody came shortly after Sami Lushtaku, the mayor of Skenderaj, had refused 
transfer to the prison in North Mitrovica.  See, “Three ex-KLA Members Accused of War Crimes Escape.” 
Radio B92, May 22 2014.  	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EULEX’s identified impropriety with regards to detention on remand, in conflict with 
established human rights principles, sets a poor example.  Likewise as does the failure to 
address it by EULEX or the constitutional court.   
Ultimately what can be concluded is that the RoL framework EULEX is working 
to strengthen in Kosovo is not sustainable without EULEX’s continued presence.  While 
it is successfully achieving short-term goals in Kosovo such as reducing smuggling in the 
North and pursuing minor criminal figures, it has not successfully invested in a long-term 
legacy, or product to leave behind (Interview with Korenica).  This has been a 
shortcoming attributed to liberal peace projects in the relevant literature (see Section II).  
The result will be a lack of self-sustaining institutions when the current EULEX mandate 
expires in 2016, and the inevitability of a prolonged EULEX presence in Kosovo 
(Interview with EULEX Strengthening Official).  However, given the public opinion 
information provided in this section, and in light of EULEX’s own questionable practices 
brought to light in the ongoing Bamieh scandal, its own sustainability and longevity are 
not certain.    
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Section VIII – Conclusions 
 
In concluding this study it is important to acknowledge that Kosovo constitutes a 
unique case in the study of peace building and more specifically RoL intervention.  
Firstly it is unique by the territory of Kosovo’s geo-spatial position between the Republic 
of Albania and the Republic of Serbia, the national homelands of Kosovo’s two dominant 
ethnic groups between which Kosovo is ethno-territorially divided.  This has had a 
profound impact on the Serb minority especially, within Kosovo.79  Rogers Brubaker 
(1995) describes this situation as a ‘triadic nexus’ between ethnic minority, domestic 
government, and external national homeland.  This relationship itself is not unique, nor is 
it unique to the former Yugoslavia.  Cases of this nexus are evident in the Serb 
population in northern Croatia (Krajina), the Albanian population in southern 
Montenegro, the Albanian population in southwestern Macedonia, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, legally divided along ethnic lines, is practically defined by such a 
relationship.  The national soccer (football) teams of the former Yugoslav states are filled 
with players representing their ethnic homelands rather than their states of birth.  What 
makes the case of Kosovo unique in this respect is that technically, under UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244, Serbia’s territorial integrity is guaranteed.  De jure, the 
Republic of Serbia is not an external national homeland for Kosovo Serbs, nor is its 
government alien.  Thus for those not recognizing Kosovo’s 2008 unilateral declaration 
of independence, including Serbia, the UN, and the majority of Kosovo Serbs, two 
domestic governments exist in Brubaker’s triad– the de jure, Republic of Serbia 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Hopes of Kosovo unification with Albania have been mostly discarded, so while its proximate 
relationship to Albania during the 1998-99 conflict was important, it is less so in the post-conflict setting.   
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government, and the de facto Kosovo government in Prishtina.  As a result of this, and in 
spite of the 1999 agreement with NATO, Serbia has maintained a comparatively robust 
position within Serbian communities in Kosovo through parallel institutions of 
administration and security, while its government has acted as the chief advocate of the 
Serb population.  Additionally the Kosovo Serb population has largely maintained claims 
of Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo.   
Kosovo further constitutes a unique case by the distribution of the Serb minority 
throughout its territory.  The four Northern Serb majority municipalities are territorially 
contiguous both with one another and with their national homeland, the Republic of 
Serbia.  Those five Serb majority municipalities south of the Ibar River, however, do not 
enjoy such territorial continuity, but rather are isolated pockets surrounded by Kosovar-
dominated territory.  They are physically separated both from their ethnic minority kin 
and their national homeland, and thus far more reliant on the domestic government than 
their minority kin in the North.  In terms of any resources (political, material, nutritional, 
medical, etc.) there is not only disparity between the ethnic groups, but within the Serb 
minority as well, divided by the Ibar River. 
It is also necessary to acknowledge the toll taken by the 1998-99 conflict and the 
following years of continued inter-ethnic violence on Kosovo.  Casualties during the war 
are currently tallied at 10,415 Kosovars, 2,197 Serbs, and 528 Bosniaks, Gorani.80  More 
significant are the figures of those expelled from or internally displaced within Kosovo.  
Roughly 850,00 Kosovars were expelled and an additional 590,000 internally displaced, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 These figures were published in the “Kosovo Memory Book” by the Humanitarian Law Center of 
Belgrade in 2015.  See, Petrit Collaku. “Experts Greet HLC’s ‘Kosovo Memory Book’.” Balkan Insight: 
Balkan Transitional Justice, Feb. 5 2015. 
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amounting to roughly 90% of the Kosovar population.81  On the other side of the conflict, 
roughly 230,000 non-Kosovars were displaced, many internally to the North, during the 
war and ensuing bouts of revenge violence.82  Every war is a unique phenomenon; 
however, the war in Kosovo conforms to the trend identified by Benjamin Valentino 
(2014).  Valentino argues that while violence against civilians, in times passed, was 
denoted as “collateral damage”, it has come to be the objective of war rather than a 
inevitable byproduct.  War has increasingly come to resemble ethnic cleansing, 
dominated by material and political reward and prolific lethal and sexual violence 
(Valentino, 2014).  The war in Kosovo, and the other Yugoslav wars, conforms to this 
pattern, and it can thus be concluded that in this respect Kosovo does not constitute a 
solely unique case.  
On the one side Kosovo constitutes a unique case with respect to the disparate 
distribution of its ethnic groups and the ambiguous status of one’s national homeland 
(Republic of Serbia) within Kosovo.  However on the other side, Kosovo’s population, on 
both sides of the ethnic cleavage, having been victimized during the war is not as unique, 
as civilians have increasingly become the target of war.  Consequently in post-war 
societies, which like Kosovo, conformed to Valetino’s post-1990 trend, ethnic groups 
will remain bitterly disaffected by the out-group.  Equally, as Sannerholm (2007) argued, 
these societies will be averse to central authority, as it was such authority that victimized 
them.    
Though Kosovo, like all post-conflict settings, is unique in any number of 
respects it also displays characteristics endemic of modern post-conflict settings.  These 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 See, Tim Judah. The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven: Yale UP, 
2000). 
82 See, Tim Judah. Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know (UK: Oxford UP, 2008).	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characteristics, identified throughout various strands of literature, have been made 
evident during the ongoing period of international stewardship and programming in 
Kosovo.  As a result of this, contemporary Kosovo constitutes a suitable case study for 
the analysis of the post-conflict normalization of rule of law.  Similarly, the European 
Union Rule of Law Mission, EULEX, constitutes a prime case study for RoL-specific 
civilian crisis management operations in modern post-conflict settings.  Lessons learned 
from EULEX’s operations in Kosovo can inform future civilian crisis management 
operations in similar settings such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, 
and Ukraine.   
Firstly it can be concluded from this research that EULEX is a highly politicized 
institution, despite seeking to present itself as a strictly technical and apolitical operation.  
The desire to rapidly and forcefully extend RoL into the North embittered the local 
population there, while empowering dominant illiberal elites, whose power was often 
times accrued through criminal and/or paramilitary activities resistant to central authority.  
The combination of a status-neutral mandate and the potential for violent reactions in the 
North pressed EULEX to adopting a strategy of building consensus on RoL – manifested 
in the dialogue processes between Kosovo and Serbia, which the EU mediates.  The 
Brussels Agreement, signed in April 2013, is the single most tangible catalyst of 
extending uniform RoL into Northern Kosovo.  Under it, Kosovo Serbs operating in the 
parallel MUP system have been integrated into a unitary Kosovo Police (KP) resulting in 
both increased operational capacity and public support for KP in the North.  However, 
while in this respect the Brussels Agreement has unquestionably advanced RoL in the 
North and whole of Kosovo, it has also constituted a detriment to RoL construction.  
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Through various provisions it has conceded RoL authority to Serb majority municipality 
governments, thus empowering their candidly illiberal elites even more, and also granted 
substantial influence to Belgrade.  On the Kosovar side, the need to reduce leadership 
uncertainty and solidify regional instability has likewise empowered illiberal elites who 
captain networks of political patrimony and enjoy the impunity of international support.   
Secondly, in addition to EULEX’s empowerment of a largely militarized and 
illiberal political elite in the Government of Kosovo, its strict focus on top-down RoL 
building has left the ‘everyday’ space largely unaffected by its reforms and programming.  
The result of this has been a generally evident lack of local ownership of laws and RoL 
institutions.  Especially in the rural spaces, the justice system of the ‘everyday’, remains 
grounded in such traditions as the legally-archaic kanun, by which such practices as 
revenge and honor killings are permitted.  Aversion to ownership over the modern justice 
system has also led to the ultimate capture of justice institutions by those illiberal elites, 
whose position EULEX solidifies for the sake of necessary stability.  Corruption goes 
largely unpunished in the compromised system.  And, attempts to pursue high-level cases 
commonly fall victim to the pressures of intimidation or political and nepotistic 
interference.  Thus it can be concluded that EULEX has ultimately failed to engender 
local ownership of the RoL system it builds, rendering its efforts not only vain, but also 
counterproductive. 
And lastly, it can be concluded that the operational model and practices employed 
by EULEX, in Kosovo, are fundamentally flawed.  Its overly bombastic and ambitious 
pronouncements upon deployment, coupled with ambiguous rhetoric and a failure to 
deliver on these fueled a plunge in public support – which has not recovered.  EULEX 
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and the EU both identified the judicial component (judges and prosecutors) as both 
critical to RoL operations and lacking in Kosovo.  Yet, this component only constitutes 
13% of EULEX’s personnel, while considerably more are devoted to the already 
functioning police component.  Issues within the limited judicial component, such as lack 
of independence, subjective case allotment, and consistent impropriety with regards to 
accepted European legal standards has greatly inhibited its function.   
The poor model EULEX employs for their local counterparts to learn from, 
coupled with the solely political advances and failure to engender local ownership results 
in an unsustainable RoL product.  Without EULEX personnel in place, the justice system 
would be completely compromised by corruption and patrimony.  However, EULEX’s 
functioning in Kosovo has only increased the exploitability of RoL institutions.  This 
includes empowering and entrenching illiberal elites, failing to deter ‘everyday’ extra-
legal traditions, and employing a model unbecoming of modern rule of law.   
Ultimately, from these three drawn conclusions, it can be determined that EULEX 
has conformed to a framework of traditional post-Cold War liberal peace theory.  This 
model embodies the inherent shortcomings identified in the related literature.  Evident in 
the first conclusion presented above is that EULEX has been unable to depart from 
politicization, despite its rhetorical portrayal of technicality and status-neutrality 
(Rajagopal, 2008; and, Petersen, 2010).  In so doing, EULEX has advanced short-term 
goals at the expensive of a long-term product by empowering illiberal actors (Stromseth, 
2008) and prioritizing western foreign policy (Duffield, 2010) rather than organic 
qualities (Mac Ginty, 2010).  The second presented conclusion demonstrates EULEX’s 
inability to cope with one of the greatest challenges to a liberal peace project presented in 
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the literature, instilling local ownership over reforms (Knoll, 2006; Roberts, 2010; and 
Greiçevci, 2011).  In failing to do this and failing to successfully incorporate the 
‘everyday’, RoL reforms have been largely rejected and citizens have sought to redress 
their grievances through traditional means (Richmond, 2010; Duffield, 2002; and, Porter 
et al., 2013).  The third conclusion accordingly supports that literature arguing for 
EULEX’s ineffectiveness (Radin, 2014; Tzifakis, 213; Papadimitriou and Petrov, 2012; 
and Greiçevci, 2011).  All of these conclusions considered and coupled with the lack of 
prospects for a sustainable RoL product equate EULEX’s operation to date with Roger 
Mac Ginty’s (2010) description of technocratic peace exercise of “ticking boxes, 
counting votes, and decommissioning weapons.”   
From observations, scholarship, and opinions voiced in interviews, the future 
functioning of Kosovo as a state is dependent upon a successful RoL system, currently 
not in place.  In addition to preventing widespread criminality, ethnic assimilation and 
economic proliferation are dependent upon it.  Before the EU deploys future RoL-based 
civilian crisis management operations in transitional settings EULEX must be evaluated 
as a paradigm upon which to develop.  It is imperative that the three conclusions reached 
in this paper are addressed and the EU departs from the traditional liberal peace theory 
framework.   	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Appendix A – Timeline of Modern Kosovo 
 
1974: Reform to Yugoslav constitution grants Kosovo (and Vojvodina) autonomous 
status as provinces of the Republic of Serbia.   
March 1981: Student protests calling for increased autonomy at the University of 
Prishtina leads to rioting in Prishtina and Kosovska Mitrovica. 
November 1988: Slobodan Milošević’s ‘Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution’ replaces top 
Kosovar politicians with loyal supports. 
February 1989: Strikes begin at the Trepča Mines, ending in the resignation of more 
Kosovar politicians. 
July 1989: Milošević delivers speech at Gazimestan (Kosovo Polje) commemorating the 
600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo.   
July 1990: Locked out Kosovar members of the assembly declare Kosovo a republic 
within Yugoslavia.  Three days later the government in Belgrade dissolves the Kosovo 
assembly. 
December 1991: Serbian MUP attempts to capture Kosovar rebels Adem and Hamëz 
Jashari in Donji Prekaz, but fails and the Jasharis flee to Albania.   
May 1992: Ibrahim Rugova elected unofficial president of Kosovo in a parallel election. 
December 1992: Serb paramilitary leader and organized crime figure Željko Raznatović, 
known as Arkan, is elected to the Kosovo assembly.   
December 1993: Kosovo Liberation Army founded. 
July 1997: The Albanian government led by Sali Berisha collapses during economic 
collapse.  Looting of armories in southern Albania ensues and Berisha opens northern 
armories to the public.  Mass amounts of automatic weapons and ordinance made 
available to the KLA.   
March 1998: MUP special police and VJ attack Jashari compound in Prekaz, killing 63 
and effectively starting the war with the KLA. 
February-March 1999: Rambouillet talks held in France with the aim of ending the 
conflict in Kosovo.   
March 1999: FRY government commenced Operation Horseshoe to expel the Kosovar 
Albanian population from Kosovo. 
March-June 1999: NATO bombing campaign led by US General Wesley Clark targets 
military and hybrid targets in Kosovo and Serbia. 
June 1999: Norwegian and British paratroops enter Prishtina.  UNSCR Resolution 1244 
passed, placing Kosovo under UN administration. 
August 1999: “Military Technical Agreement” signed between KFOR and FRY 
preventing VJ or MUP from operating in Kosovo. 
October 2000: First elections held in post-war Kosovo – Serbs boycott. 
May 2001: Provisional Institutions for Self Governance (PISG) established under 
UNMIK, including the Kosovo Assembly, the President of Kosovo, and courts. 
October 2002: Kosovo holds municipal elections, that are again boycotted by Serbs. 
March 2004: mass rioting targeted at the non-Kosovar population sweeps across Kosovo 
destroying 550 homes, 27 Orthodox sites, and displacing 4,100 people. 
November 2004: Fatmir Limaj acquitted by ICTY and released.   
November 2005: former Finnish President and diplomat Martti Ahtisaari is appointed the 
Secretary General’s special envoy for the future status of Kosovo. 
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May 2007: the United States and European members of the UN Security Council 
approve Ahtisaari’s proposal for supervised independence. 
July 2007: Russia vetoes the Ahtisaari proposal for supervised independence. 
February 2008: Council of the EU approves ESDP mission EULEX within the 
framework of the Ahtisaari Proposal. 
February 2008: Kosovo unilaterally declares independence from Serbia and is 
immediately recognized by among others, the US, UK, Albania, Turkey, and France. 
February-March 2008: North Kosovo Serbs burn customs gates 1 and 31 on 
administrative boundary with Serbia. 
April 2008: Former Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj acquitted by ICTY for 
lack of evidence.  Primary witness died in a drunk driving accident during trial. 
June 2008: Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo takes effect, with as an annex the 
Ahtisaari Proposal, which is to take primacy over any other GoK legislation. 
November 2008: Six-Point Plan is reached between the UN Secretary General and 
Serbia, placing EULEX within the framework of UNSCR 1244 and status neutrality. 
December 2008: EULEX begins deployment in Kosovo. 
April 2009: EULEX becomes fully deployed in Kosovo under HoM Yves de Kermabon. 
August 2009: Belgrade sponsors parallel elections in Peja/Peć and Gračanica. 
November 2009: Elections held, including the new municipalities for the first – Northern 
Serbs boycott the elections, but Serb turnout in other municipalities is higher than in 
previous parallel elections.  Serbs win in Gračanica, Ranilug, Kllokot/Vrbovać, and 
Štrpce.   
April 2010: EULEX raids Kosovo Transport Ministry and arrests Minister Fatmir Limaj 
on charges of corruption. 
May 2010: Fatmir Limaj charged for war crimes by EULEX. 
May 2010: Belgrade-sponsored parallel elections held in North Mitrovica, which the 
international community do not denounce. 
October 2010: former commander of KFOR, General Xavier Bout de Marnhac, becomes 
EULEX HoM. 
December 2010: Vote of no confidence leads to parliamentary elections, in which 
Hashim Thaçi is elected Prime Minister.  Suspicion of fraud in the election process.  The 
same day as the elections the Dick Marty Report is published alleging Thaçi’s 
participation in the “Yellow House Case” – a war time operation that harvested organs 
from kidnapped Serbs and Kosovars in northern Albania.   
March 2011: EU-mediated technical dialogue with Serbia commences. 
July 2011: violence in the North breaks out when KP special police attempt to seize 
customs gates 1 and 31. 
September 2011: violence in the North resumes when EULEX attempts to implement 
customs stamps agreement with Serbia. 
October 2011: Agim Zogaj, “Witness X” in the Limaj trial, commits suicide in 
Duisburg, Germany.   
February 2012: last of the roadblocks in the North, excluding the main bridge in 
Mitrovica, removed by KFOR. 
February 2012: EU-mediated technical dialogue with Serbia concludes, reaching 7 
conclusions total. 
March 2012: Fatmir Limaj acquitted of war crimes charges and released. 
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September 2012: Fatmir Limaj again arrest on war crimes charges by EULEX.   
October 2012: EU-mediated political dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade 
commences. 
December 2012: former German Ambassador to Albania, Bernd Borchardt is appointed 
EULEX HoM. 
April 2013: ‘First agreement of principles governing the normalization of relations’ 
(Brussels Agreement) reached in Prishtina-Belgrade political dialogue.  Mediated by EU, 
but US diplomat Philip Reeker also present.   
September 2013: EULEX Lithuanian customs officer, Audrius Šenavičius, shot dead in 
an ambush in Zvečan, becoming the first and only EULEX casualty.   
Septebmer 2013: Fatmir Limaj acquitted of war crimes charges by EULEX.   
November 2013: Serb majority municipalities participate in Kosovo elections at 
Belgrade behest, without holding parallel elections. 
March 2014: Fatmir Limaj and Jakup Krasniqi form Nisma për Kosovën (Initiative for 
Kosovo) to oppose ruling PDK.   
May 2014: Slobodan Sovrlić arrested in Zubin Potok, but broken out by a mob outside of 
the police station. 
June 2014: EULEX renews mandate until 2016, assuming more responsible for MMA 
and reducing executive actions, except in the North.   
June 2014: EULEX removes the barricade on the main bridge in Mitrovica and northern 
Serbs replace it with the ‘peace park’.  Rioting in South Mitrovica follows.   
September 2014: Serbia-Albania soccer match in Belgrade ends violently and is 
followed by attacks against Serb homes and property in Kosovo.  Attacks against ethnic 
Albanians in Vojvodina and Montenegro also occur.   
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Appendix B – Kosovo Municipalities 
 	  
	  	  
Image 4: Kosovo Municipalities.  When differing, Serbian name is listed first and 
Albanian name is listed in parentheses.  Image credit: European Stability Initiative, 
http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=yu&id=311&film_ID=2&slide_ID=24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   100	  
Appendix C – Interview Protocol 
Approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, 2014.   
Target Group: Participants from EULEX  
1. Can you identify the three biggest obstacles to the rule of law in Kosovo? 
2. Are the obstacles to the rule of law different in the Kosovo-Serb municipalities, 
and do relations with Belgrade present an obstacle? 
3. Does EULEX have a more or less active role in the rule of law in these 
municipalities than in the rest of Kosovo? 
a. If yes, how so? More numbers? More cases handled? More 
responsibilities? 
4. Does EULEX interact more or less with local authorities in these municipalities 
than in the rest of Kosovo? 
5. How do the publics in these municipalities receive EULEX and European rule of 
law? 
6. What steps are taken to incorporate the local institutions in these municipalities 
with EULEX and the overall development of rule of law? 
a. Are these local institutions sustainable after EULEX leaves? 
Target Group: Participants from media institutions 
1. What is the public view of EULEX in the Kosovo-Serb municipalities? 
2. How is this different than the public view of EULEX in the rest of Kosovo? 
3. Does EULEX invite the help of local institutions in the Kosovo-Serb 
municipalities, or are they marginalized? 
4. What obstacles to EULEX and the rule of law exist in the Kosovo-Serb 
municipalities? 
5. Has the EULEX presence in benefitted or harmed the rule of law in Kosovo? 
6. Are the institutions EULEX is building sustainable when EULEX leaves Kosovo? 
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